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THE SOUNDS OF SILENCE: RECONSIDERING THE
INVOCATION OF THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
UNDER MIRANDA
Marcy Strauss*
If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness
of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong
with that system.'
In 1966, the Supreme Court handed down one of its best-known decisions-
Miranda v. Arizona.2 In that decision, the Court attempted to strike the appropriate
balance between law enforcement interests in obtaining a confession and a suspect's
Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself.' The opinion decreed that this
balance is preserved by "giving the defendant the power to exert some control over
the course of the interrogation."4 Thus, the decision mandated that the suspect be
informed prior to any custodial interrogation that he has the right to remain silent and
the right to an attorney and that no interrogation can occur until the suspect waives
these rights. Moreover, the suspect can assert these rights at any point during the
interrogation and, if he does, questioning must immediately cease.
Although these protections seem on first blush to effectively empower a suspect
to choose whether to speak to the police, many have deemed Miranda a "spectacular
failure."5 Although there are numerous critics of the Miranda decision and its
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1981.
B.S., Northwestern University, 1978. As always, I am grateful to Erwin Chemerinsky for
reading and critiquing this manuscript. Thanks are also owed to my research assistants, Amir
Boroumand, Victoria Jalili, and Arsen Kourinian.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the
Guilty?, 10 CHAP. L. REv. 551,551 (2007) ("Miranda v. Arizona is probably the most widely
recognized court decision ever rendered."); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84
CORNELLL. REv. 109, 110 (1998). Virtually everyone is familiar with the Miranda warnings
from television and movies. Marcy Strauss, Silence, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101, 142 (2001)
(citing Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 405 (1998) ("And as for the possibility that the
person under investigation may be unaware of his right to remain silent: In the modem age
of frequently dramatized 'Miranda' warnings, that is implausible.")).
' Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439-42.
4 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986).
' Sandra Guerra Thompson, Evading Miranda. How Seibert and Patane Failed to "Save"
Miranda, 40 VAL. U. L. REv. 645,645 (2006); see also Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping,
1 OHiO ST. J. CRIM. L. 309, 309-12 (2003); George C. Thomas Im, Miranda's Illusion: Telling
Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1091, 1092, 1094 n.16 (2003)
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progeny on a variety of levels, 6 what has received too little attention is whether the
most basic protection of the Miranda decision operates effectively. That is, can a
suspect effectively assert the right to remain silent, and, perhaps as importantly, do the
police appropriately respect such an assertion?
This Article explores that question by considering what constitutes an assertion
of the right to remain silent. Although Miranda suggested that "[fif the individual
indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to
remain silent, the interrogation must cease,"7 subsequent cases have required a more
explicit invocation of the desire not to speak. Relying on Davis v. United States,8 a
Supreme Court decision addressing the invocation of the right to counsel, the bulk of
lower courts currently require that a suspect unambiguously invoke the right to remain
silent.9 Such a transposition of the requirements for asserting the right to remain
silent with the right to counsel is wrong as a matter of law, unwise as a matter of
policy, and threatens to eviscerate the core protection of Miranda.
This Article argues that the lower courts, by requiring that the right to remain silent
be unambiguously asserted, have gone astray from what was intended in Miranda.
The passage of time since Miranda and Davis has revealed one indisputable fact:
rarely do suspects invoke their rights. Only twenty percent initially assert their rights
rather than waive them; and almost no suspects assert their rights after a valid waiver.'
[hereinafter Thomas, Miranda's Illusion] (reviewing WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA'S WANING
PROTECTIONS (2001)) ("[Bly most accounts, Miranda has been a spectacular failure.").
Although Miranda's success or failure may be a subject of debate and dispute, most would
agree that the Court, in the forty odd years since that decision has "restricted some of the gen-
erous language of Miranda." Charles R. Shreffier, Jr., JudicialApproaches to the Ambiguous
Request for Counsel Since Miranda v. Arizona, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 460, 460 (1987)
(making this comment with respect to the first twenty years). But see Lawrence Rosenthal,
Against Orthodoxy: Miranda Is Not Prophylactic and the Constitution Is Not Perfect, 10
CHAP. L. REv. 579, 584-86 (2007).
6 Yale Kamisar, one of the most prominent criminal procedure scholars, wrote that
"Miranda is probably the most criticized and most misunderstood criminal procedure case
in American legal history." Yale Kamisar, How Earl Warren 's Twenty-Two Years in Law
Enforcement Affected His Work as Chief Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 11, 26 (2005); see also
Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary Law and
Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REv. 781 (2006) (discussing some of the criticism); Joille Anne
Moreno, Faith-Based Miranda?: Why the New Missouri v. Seibert Police "Bad Faith" Test
Is a Terrible Idea, 47 ARIZ. L. REv. 395 (2005) (criticizing the Court's recent post-Miranda
decision: Seibert v. Patane). One recent, persistent, and fairly successful cry for reform involves
the use of videotaping confessions. Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons
of History: The NeedforMandatory Recording of Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess
the Reliability and Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 619 (2004).
' Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
8 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
9 See infra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
10 See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
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While some suspects undoubtedly waive their rights because they affirmatively want
to talk to the police, this Article maintains that these statistics have a more nefarious
explanation: court decisions have made it extremely difficult for suspects who wish
to assert their rights to do so. Judges have gone to extraordinary lengths to classify
even seemingly clear invocations as ambiguous invocations which can be ignored by
the police. Once a suspect's attempted invocation is ignored, moreover, the chance
that he subsequently will more clearly and forcefully assert his rights during the inter-
rogation is substantially reduced. As a result, Miranda's promise that suspects freely
determine whether and when they wish to submit to custodial interrogation is an
empty one.
In Part I of this Article, I explore the basic principles in Miranda and subsequent
case law concerning the invocation of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel.
Although no Supreme Court case after Miranda explicitly addressed the invocation
of the right to remain silent, in Part II I describe how the lower courts have, with few
exceptions, applied Davis to require that the right to remain silent can only be invoked
by an unambiguous statement and that the police need not cease questioning nor pose
clarifying questions in the face of an ambiguous invocation. As a result, suspects who
use modal verbs like "maybe," "might," or "could," or hedge a request by saying
things like "I think I want to stop talking," or that "they want to leave," or even that
they don't want to talk now have not unambiguously invoked a right to remain silent
and these statements can be effectively ignored. In Part Ill, I argue that Davis should
not be applied to invocations of the right to remain silent. First, Davis was wrongly
decided and should be overturned. Second, even if Davis is not overturned, it should
not be extended to the right to remain silent. As a matter of law, the right to counsel
and the right to remain silent are separable and distinct rights that should not be
equated. Moreover, applying the clear invocation rule of Davis to the right to re-
main silent is wrong as a matter of policy because it undermines the central goal of
Miranda: to ensure that a suspect makes a free choice to speak to the police. Finally,
even if Davis applied to the right to remain silent, it should be limited to post-waiver
invocations only.
In the last Part, I briefly sketch and discuss an alternative approach to that in
Davis: a version of the stop-and-clarify approach for ambiguous invocations in con-
junction with some modification of the Miranda warnings. While a rule requiring
that all interrogation must cease at any invocation, clear or not, is most faithful to the
language and values of Miranda, such a position is unlikely to be adopted. Thus, this
Article urges that at a minimum, the courts should require that any ambiguous or
equivocal request be clarified prior to continued questioning of a suspect. Moreover,
the Miranda warnings should be altered to include an explicit reminder to the suspect
they can assert their right to remain silent at any time, and that such an assertion would
not be used against them.
2009]
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIRANDA RIGHTS
The Miranda decision was an attempt to establish clear, bright-line rules to
protect a suspect from police coercion during custodial interrogation." Prior to
1966, the law of interrogations was largely governed by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which employed a "totality of circumstances approach"
to condemn police misconduct that overbore the will of the suspect. 2 While such
an approach ensured that the most egregious police behavior-such as physical
abuse-was condemned, "it left largely uncontrolled a myriad of other practices that
did not reflect physical abuse but operated to coerce a suspect into making a state-
ment." 3 Believing that law enforcement officers were becoming more sophisticated
in their interrogation tactics and that coercion was often difficult to ascertain, the
Court shifted from a due process approach to one that emphasized the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. 4
In the four cases that were consolidated in Miranda, the Court ruled that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protected a suspect during custodial
interrogations which contain "inherently compelling pressures" that could undermine
a suspect's right to remain silent. 5 To protect a person's opportunity to exercise his
privilege, the Court developed the now-famous set of warnings: the suspect must be
told he has a right to remain silent and that anything said may be used against him; 6
the suspect must be informed he has a right to have an attorney present during ques-
tioning, and that an attorney will be appointed if the person cannot afford one.'7 These
" See Weisselberg, supra note 2, at 113 (stating that pre-Miranda rules were difficult
for the courts to follow and the police to apply and that Miranda recognized the need for
clear rules).
12 See, e.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219
(1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
13 Marcy Strauss, Reinterrogation, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 364 (1995).
14 In between the Court flirted with a right to counsel approach. See Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964); see also Thomas, Miranda's Illusion, supra note 5, at 1113 n.91.
'" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
16 Some commentators have persuasively argued that several additional warnings should
be provided, including a statement that if you do not talk it will not be held against you and
reminding the suspect that he or she can assert these rights at any time in the interrogation.
See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
7 Of course, most suspects who invoke the right to an attorney will not be provided with
an attorney during interrogation. Since police officers know that any attorney worth her salt
would simply advise her client to stop talking, providing an attorney during interrogation is
generally seen as a waste of money and time. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda,
80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 734-35 (1992) ("Virtually any competent lawyer would advise his
client in the strongest possible terms to remain silent .... "). Thus, once a suspect invokes
the right to counsel, questioning simply ceases. Timothy P. O'Neill, Why Miranda Does Not
Prevent Confessions: Some Lessons from Albert Camus, Arthur Miller and Oprah Winfrey,
51 SYRACUSE L. REv. 863, 874 n. 100 (2001) ("In reality, the Miranda promise of a right to
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warnings must be provided even if the suspect is otherwise aware of his rights because
the "warning is an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the
interrogation atmosphere."' 8 Once the warnings have been provided, the "subsequent
procedure is clear":19
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.
At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment
privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot
be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the
right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates
on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after
the privilege has been once invoked. If the individual states that he wants
an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.2°
Alternatively, if interrogation continues, a "heavy burden" rests on the government
to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.2
Despite the length of the Miranda decision, significant questions remained on
virtually every aspect of the decision.22 It would be left to subsequent courts to sort
counsel is somewhat illusory. If a suspect asks for counsel, police will usually end all attempts
at interrogation. Since the police know that an attorney will simply tell the suspect not to
answer questions, it is easier to simply stop attempts to interrogate."). Of course, the Sixth
Amendment guarantees the suspect the actual provision of an attorney at critical stages in the
proceeding, including interrogation, once judicial proceedings have been initiated. Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
18 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468. But see Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195,202-05 (1989)
(holding that warnings need not be given in the exact form provided by the Miranda decision).
'9 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473.
20 Id. at 473-74 (footnote omitted).
21 See generally Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (setting forth the waiver rule
generally employed in Miranda). Post-Miranda cases have made clear that the burden is not
as heavy as originally envisioned. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,427-28 (1986) (holding
that a suspect need not be provided with flow of information to help calibrate decision to waive,
and thus suspect need not be told that an attorney would like to see him); North Carolina v.
Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (holding an implied waiver valid).
22 Indeed, the number of decisions elaborating upon the various principles set forth in
Miranda is vast, and many believe that most post-Miranda decisions have weakened the
original safeguards. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda:
Modem Interrogators' Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 397, 402-07 (1999) (noting that "[a]s a result of the Burger and Rehnquist Court's
post-Miranda decisions, Miranda is no longer one case" but a group of them imposing "less
strict safeguards than the original decision"). Professor Yale Kamisar noted that he considers
this comment "an understatement." Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda
20091
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out the meaning of "custody" and "interrogation"--the prerequisites before warnings
are even required.23 Most important for this discussion, both the meaning of invoca-
tion and the consequences of invoking rights remained grist for further development.
It was the latter issue--the precise consequences of invoking the right to remain silent
or the right to counsel-that engaged the courts first. Almost a decade after the
Miranda decision, the Supreme Court considered whether the police could resume
questioning a suspect after he asserted his right to remain silent.24 Although Miranda
clearly stated that once a person invokes the right to remain silent any questioning
must immediately cease, the Court provided no real guidance beyond this rather mini-
malist provision. Does this mean that questioning must cease forever?
In Michigan v. Mosley, the Court rejected the notion that a suspect who invokes
his right to remain silent is forever barred from being interrogated.25 In that case, the
defendant was arrested for several robberies and was provided his Miranda warnings
prior to custodial interrogation. After waiving his rights and answering some initial
questions, the interrogation stopped when Mosley stated that he did not want to dis-
cuss the robberies any longer. About two hours later, different detectives approached
Mosley and questioned him at a different location about a fatal shooting that had
occurred during a different robbery than the ones that were the subject of the earlier
interrogation. Mosley was issued new Miranda warnings, and he agreed to talk about
the murder. After fifteen minutes of questioning, Mosley confessed to the murder
after being told that a confederate had implicated him as the shooter.26
Mosley's confession was admitted at trial and he was convicted of murder.27 On
appeal, Mosley argued that his Fifth Amendment rights had been violated when the
government re-questioned him after he had asserted his right to remain silent. The
Supreme Court disagreed.28 The Court held that Miranda's admonition that interro-
gation must immediately cease upon assertion of the right cannot "sensibly be read to
create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any
police officer on any subject., 29 Such a reading would "transform the Miranda safe-
guards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity.... ,3o
On the other hand, the Court recognized that repeated rounds of questioning after
a defendant has stated his desire to remain silent will almost certainly undermine a
Case: Why We Needed It, How We Got It-And What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 163, 178 n.69 (2007).
23 For a sampling of cases dealing with the issue of custody, see Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420 (1984), and Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam). For the
meaning of interrogation, see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
24 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
Id. at 102-03.
26 Id. at 97-98.
27 Id. at 98-99.
28 Id. at 104.
29 Id. at 102-03.
30 Id. at 102.
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suspect's free will; such an occurrence would convey to the suspect that the police
were not prepared to honor his invocation. Hence, the Court held that a determination
must be made whether, considering the totality of circumstances, a suspect's right to
cut off questioning was "scrupulously honored."
3
'
The Court concluded that Mosley' s rights were scrupulously honored even though
questioning resumed. In so holding, the Court emphasized six factors. First, the
questions immediately ceased after Mosley initially asserted his right to remain silent.
Second, there was some passage of time between the invocation of the right and the
second interrogation. Third, the officers re-read the Miranda warnings, reminding
the suspect of his rights and their willingness to adhere to them. Fourth, the second
interrogation was conducted by different officers than the first one. Fifth, the new
interrogation involved a different topic than the earlier one. Sixth, and finally, the
second interrogation occurred at a new location than the first one.3 2 In these circum-
stances, the Court held, a suspect would not feel that he was being subjected to one
continuous interrogation or that his will was being worn down. Nor would he feel that
his original request to remain silent was being ignored and that, therefore, re-asserting
his rights would be futile. Rather, a suspect in these circumstances would feel that his
right to remain silent had been scrupulously honored.33
Since Mosley, lower courts have provided different weight to the six factors noted
there. Nonetheless, most agree that the first three factors are inviolate. 34 A suspect
would not believe that his right to remain silent had been respected if the interrogation
did not immediately cease, if some (undefined) time period did not pass, and if new
rights were not provided.35 The other three factors (new officers, new location, new
topic) are not essential and seem to "play off" against the passage of time.36 That is,
the longer the passage of time between the invocation of the right to remain silent and
the new interrogation, the less these three factors are needed. The shorter the pas-
sage of time, the more important one or more of them might be to dispelling any
indicia of one continuous interrogation. Thus, in Mosley, which involved a relatively
short passage of time (only about two hours), these other elements were important fac-
tors that militated against the interrogation seeming like one continuous interrogation.
31 Id. at 104 (citation omitted).
32 Id. at 104-05.
13 Id. at 104-07.
' See infra notes 35, 168 and accompanying text.
35 Cf. State v. Jackson, 640 A.2d 863, 873 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (stating that
the re-issuance of Miranda warnings is a bright-line, inflexible, minimum requirement).
36 See, e.g., People v. Wellhausen, No. 258286,2006 WL 1083906, at *2-3 (Mich. Ct. App.
Apr. 25, 2006) (per curiam) (holding that police scrupulously honored defendant's rights
when, twelve to fourteen hours after invoking his right to remain silent, police approached
him again, police read him his rights, and he waived those rights); Commonwealth v. Tyree,
No. 2484-00-2, 2001 WL 379131, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2001) ("[P]olice did not prop-
erly honor defendant's rights by resuming interrogation with respect to an offense then subject
to his right to silence exercised only three hours previously.").
2009]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
In a case where the same officer approaches the suspect about the same crime but
does so several days later, the absence of these factors likely would be insignificant.
Mosley, of course, involved the invocation of the right to remain silent. What
if the suspect invokes the right to an attorney instead? Should the courts utilize the
"scrupulously honored" standard employed in the right to remain silent? Six years
after Mosley, the Court addressed this question and rejected the Mosley test in favor
of a bright-line rule that made re-interrogation more difficult once a suspect asks for
an attorney rather than requests to remain silent. In Edwards v. Arizona, the Su-
preme Court adopted a per se proscription upon further questioning of indefinite
duration after the suspect invokes the right to counsel; only if the suspect initiated
conversation and then waived his rights would interrogation outside the presence of
counsel be permissible.37
In Edwards, the defendant was arrested for burglary, robbery and first degree
murder.3' After being read his Miranda rights at the police station, he waived his
rights and agreed to talk. After being told that another suspect had implicated him in
the crimes, Edwards sought to "make a deal. 39 When the officer told him he did not
have the authority to deal, Edwards then stated: "I want an attorney before making
a deal."4 At this point, questioning stopped, and Edwards was taken to jail.41
Early the next morning, two different detectives came to the jail to speak to
Edwards. While initially Edwards resisted seeing the detectives, he was told that he
"had to"; after being read his rights again, Edwards agreed to talk so long as he could
hear the taped statement of the accomplice who had fingered him. 4 After listening to
the tape, Edwards agreed to make a statement so long as it was not on tape. He then
implicated himself in the crime.43 His confession was introduced at trial and he was
convicted." On appeal, Edwards argued that his Miranda rights had been violated
when the police officers interrogated him after he had invoked his right to counsel,
and the Supreme Court agreed:
[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel pre-
sent during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right
37 451 U.S. 477, 478, 484-85 (1981).
38 Id. at 478.
'9 Id. at 479.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
4 Edwards was tried without the confession and convicted. A retrial was ordered (on
different grounds) and on the day he was to be retried, Edwards pled guilty in return for a
fifteen-year sentence. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 435,
460 n.62 (1987) (citing Interview by Stephen J. Schulhofer with Michael J. Meehan, Attorney
for Edwards (Feb. 18, 1987)).
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cannot be established by showing only that he responded to fur-
ther police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been
advised of his rights.... [An accused, such as Edwards, having
expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel,
is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until coun-
sel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with
the police.4"
In sum, the Court adopted more stringent protection when a suspect invokes the
right to counsel than when the suspect "only" invokes the right to remain silent. A
suspect's assertion of the right to remain silent needs to be scrupulously honored, but
the passage of time---even as short as two hours--could allow subsequent attempts to
re-interrogate in appropriate circumstances. A suspect's invocation of the right to
counsel, on the other hand, operates as an absolute bar to any police-initiated interr-
ogation. A waiver after fresh warnings, the passage of time, questioning on a new
crime-all are irrelevant; the waiver is presumptively invalid in the absence of evi-
dence that the suspect initiated the conversation.
Although by the early 1980s the Supreme Court had established that the impli-
cation of invoking the right to counsel is different than asserting the right to remain
silent, it was not for another thirteen years that the Court considered the threshold
question of what constitutes an invocation in the first place. In 1994, the Supreme
Court considered whether a suspect who ambiguously asked for an attorney had
"invoked" his right to counsel under Miranda.
Prior to this time, the lower courts were split among three different approaches.
Some courts had held that if the suspect makes any request that can be construed as
a request for counsel, ambiguous or not, any interrogation must immediately cease.
In other words, even an ambiguous request for counsel constituted an invocation of
the right to counsel.46 Other courts took the exact opposite approach: the police
may ignore any ambiguous requests for an attorney, and need stop interrogations
only if the request is clear and unequivocal.47 Most courts, however, took a middle
approach: when faced with an ambiguous request for counsel, the police may ask
41 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. For a discussion of the standards for initiation, see Oregon
v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983), where the Court held that a suspect initiates
under Edwards by saying something related to the investigation as opposed to a comment
made incident to being in custody. As the Court explained, initiation occurs by an inquiry that
can "be fairly said to represent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized
discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation." Id. at 1045. Asking for a drink
of water or to use the telephone would not constitute initiation because they are "routine
incidents of the custodial relationship." Id.; see also infra note 171.
46 See, e.g., Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978).
" See People v. Kendricks, 459 N.E.2d 1137, 1140 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); State v. Moore,
744 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
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questions, but only to clarify whether the suspect does or does not want the presence
of an attorney during interrogation. If the suspect unambiguously indicates a desire
for counsel, then all questions must cease. If the response to the clarifying questions
indicates that the suspect is willing to speak without an attorney present, the interro-
gation may proceed.4"
Almost thirty years after Miranda had been decided, the Supreme Court, in Davis
v. United States, finally addressed this critical question: what exactly triggers the pro-
tections set forth in Miranda and Edwards?49 Davis, a member of the U.S. Navy, was
accused of killing a fellow officer over a game of pool. He was arrested, brought to
an interrogation room, and read his rights. Davis waived his rights both orally and in
writing. After more than an hour of questioning, Davis said, "Maybe I should talk
to a lawyer."5 At this point, the agents testified that
we made it very clear that we're not here to violate his rights, that
if he wants a lawyer, then we will stop any kind of questioning
with him, that we weren't going to pursue the matter unless we
have it clarified is he asking for a lawyer or is he just making a
comment about a lawyer, and he said, "No, I'm not asking for a
lawyer," and then he continued on, and said, "No, I don't want
a lawyer."51
After a short break and after a re-reading of the Miranda rights, the interrogation
resumed. About an hour later, Davis made some incriminating statements, and then
said, "I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else., 5 2 At this point, all ques-
tioning ceased.
At his court-martial, Davis's motion to suppress the statements made during the
interrogation was denied. The statements were admitted, Davis was convicted of
unpremeditated murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison. 3 After his convic-
tion had been affirmed up the military chain of appeals, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide how law enforcement officers should respond when faced with
an ambiguous request for counsel during custodial interrogation.5
4
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, held that after suspects waived their
Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning them unless they
clearly and unequivocally request an attorney:
55
48 See Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981
(1979).
49 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
5o Id. at 455.
51 Id.
52 id.
53 id.
* Id. at 454.
15 Id. at 459.
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[I]f a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous
or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circum-
stances would have understood only that the suspect might be
invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the
cessation of questioning....
Rather, the suspect must unambiguously request counsel. 6
The test set forth by the Court for determining whether a request is unambiguous
is an objective one. "Although a suspect need not 'speak with the discrimination of
an Oxford don,' he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently
clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the
statement to be a request for an attorney. '57 Here, the Court accepted the lower
court's conclusion that Davis's statement, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," was
not a reasonably clear request for counsel. 8 Thus, the Naval Investigative Service
agents did not have to cease questioning Davis, and his subsequent statements were
admissible in court.59
In embracing this approach, O'Connor emphatically rejected the alternative
suggested by some lower courts that any invocation, ambiguous or not, constitutes
an invocation of the right to counsel under Edwards. As the Court noted:
[I]f we were to require questioning to cease if a suspect makes
a statement that might be a request for an attorney... [p]olice
officers would be forced to make difficult judgment calls about
whether the suspect in fact wants a lawyer even though he has not
said so, with the threat of suppression if they guess wrong. Such
an approach "would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly
irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity."6
The "stop-and-clarify approach" received a more favorable review; O'Connor
suggested that it might be good police practice to ask clarifying questions when the
56 Id. (citations omitted).
7 Id. (citation omitted).
s Id. at 462.
'9 Interestingly, later courts often rely heavily on this part of the decision to conclude that
statements like this are ambiguous. However, the Supreme Court assumed, without discussion,
that the statement was ambiguous. Id. ('The courts below found that petitioner's remark to the
NIS agents 'maybe I should talk to a lawyer' was not a request for counsel, and we see no
reason to disturb that conclusion."). The petitioner wanted to argue that the statement was not
ambiguous; the government argued that the issue was not properly before the court because
it was not included within the questions to which the Court granted certiorari. See Jane M.
Faulkner, Note, So You Kinda, Sorta, Think You Might Need a Lawyer?: Ambiguous Requests
for Counsel After Davis v. United States, 49 ARK. L. REV. 275, 296 & n. 134 (1996) (citing
Respondent's Brief at 81, Davis, 512 U.S. 452 (No. 92-1949)).
6 Id. at 460 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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suspect makes an ambiguous comment or request for an attorney. Nonetheless, such
a practice is not required and police are free to ignore ambiguous invocations of the
right to counsel.6'
II. IMPORTING DAVIS: REQUIRING THAT THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT BE
ASSERTED UNAMBIGUOUSLY
Davis involved a post-waiver invocation of the right to counsel; no Supreme
Court decision has explicitly or implicitly applied the reasoning in that case to invo-
cations of the right to remain silent. Nonetheless, those lower courts that have con-
sidered the question have almost unanimously done so. With few exceptions, the
majority of jurisdictions have imported the ruling in Davis beyond its terms to apply
to both Miranda rights.62 This section explores that phenomenon in two ways. First,
a precise description of the case law is provided: a listing of which jurisdictions have
embraced the Davis rule for the right to remain silent, which have rejected it, and
which had not yet decided as of February, 2008 is provided. Second, the practical
effect of utilizing the "unambiguous invocation" standard for the right to remain silent
is explored. In other words, this section considers the types of statements that have
been deemed ambiguous versus those that constitute explicit assertions.
A. Adopting Davis: A Score from the Federal and State Courts
In both the federal courts and the states, a majority of courts have held that the
rule in Davis, although devised for invocations of the right to counsel, also applies
to the right to remain silent.
1. The Federal Courts
In the federal courts, nine out of the eleven circuits and the District of Columbia
have either expressly held that a suspect must unambiguously invoke the right to re-
main silent63 or that it would not be an unreasonable application of clearly established
61 Id. at 461.
62 Indeed, many secondary sources state the rule as an established principle of criminal
law. See, e.g., Thirty-Sixth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Investigation and Police
Practices: Custodial Interrogation, 36 GEO. L.J. ANN. REv. CRIM. PROC. 183 (2007) ("If the
invocation of the right to remain silent is ambiguous or equivocal, further questioning is per-
missible." (footnotes omitted)); see also 2 LAFAvE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.9(g)
(3d ed. 2007) (describing the stop-and-clarify position with respect to the right to remain silent
as debatable now in light of Davis).
63 Sixth Circuit: McGraw v. Holland, 257 F.3d 513,519 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Davis
and finding request unambiguous); United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d 751,760 (6th Cir. 2000).
Seventh Circuit: United States v. Sherrod, 445 F.3d 980, 982 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1230 (2007) (holding that a defendant's statement did not constitute unambiguous
assertion of right to remain silent); United States v. Mills, 122 F.3d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 1997),
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federal law to apply Davis to the right to remain silent.64 One circuit-the Second
Circuit-assumed that Davis applied to the right to remain silent, although it did not
hold that it did so.65 No appellate court has yet held that Davis is limited to invoca-
tions of the right to counsel and should not be employed to determine whether a sus-
pect has invoked his right to remain silent. Thus, as the Tenth Circuit recently noted,
"[E]very circuit that has addressed the issue squarely has concluded that Davis applies
to both components of Miranda, the right to counsel and the right to remain silent.
'
"
6
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1033 (1997); United States v. Banks, 78 F.3d 1190, 1197 (7th Cir.
1996). Eight Circuit: Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1124, 1131 (8th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 924 (2001). Tenth Circuit: United States v. Nelson, 450 F.3d 1201,
1211-12 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 937 (2006). Eleventh Circuit: Valle v. Sec'y
for the Dep't of Corr., 459 F.3d 1206, 1213-15 (1 1th Cir. 2006); United States v. Del Rio,
168 F. App'x 923,927 (11 th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 853 (2006); United States v.
Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1154-55 (11th Cir. 2004). District of Columbia: United States v.
Anderson, No. 95-3048, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 7286, at *5 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 1996) (per
curiam) (applying the Davis rule).
6 For many of the cases, the case is heard in federal court as a habeas petition under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996). Under this statute, federal courts review state
judgments only to determine whether those judgments construe or apply federal law in a
manner that is contrary to or an "unreasonable application of' the Supreme Court's "clearly
established" precedent. See, e.g., Bui v. DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232, 239 (1st Cir. 1999). Courts
taking this approach include the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. First Circuit: James
v. Marshall, 322 F.3d 103, 108 (1st Cir. 2003). Fourth Circuit: Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d
172, 200 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that although the Fourth Circuit had not yet determined
whether Davis is applicable to invocations of the right to remain silent, under the AEDPA,
the court need only decide whether the Virginia Supreme Court's decision to admit the
suspect's statement was contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court; in light of Davis "we cannot say that it was"), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1283
(2000). Fifth Circuit: Hopper v. Dretke, 106 F. App'x 22, 229-31 (5th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 544 U.S. 914 (2005) (applying, without discussion, Davis). But see Soffar v.
Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 593-94 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that it was not addressing
whether the Davis standard applies but nonetheless finding that the defendant did not invoke
his right because it was not a clear invocation). Ninth Circuit: Arnold v. Runnels, 421 F.3d
859, 866 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that suspect unambiguously asserted right to remain
silent and thus again left open the question of whether Davis applies equally to the invocation
of the right to silence); Evans v. Demosthenes, 98 F.3d 1174, 1176 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 521 U.S. 1108 (1997). But see Monzano v. Pliler, 192 F. App'x 605, 606 (9th Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1099 (2006) (finding that the California Court of Appeals
decision that the defendant did not unambiguously invoke his right to remain silent was not
contrary to nor involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and
therefore the defendant was not entitled to habeas relief on this claim and citing Davis and
stating that Runnels, 421 F.3d 859, had applied Davis to the right to remain silent).
65 United States v. Ramirez, 79 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 850
(1996).
6 United States v. Nelson, 450 F.3d 1201, 1211-12 (10th Cir. 2006).
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Although the majority of courts may have applied Davis to the right to remain
silent, they did so perfunctorily. None of the courts provided any detailed explanation
for why that Supreme Court decision transcended the right to counsel and applied as
well to the right to remain silent. For example, the Tenth Circuit simply referred to
the weight of authority applying Davis to both components of Miranda (the right to
counsel and the right to remain silent) and stated: "We agree with this reasoning."67
Even when some analysis is provided, it is extraordinarily cursory. Typical is the
approach of the Eleventh Circuit, which recited the justifications provided in Davis
and simply concluded that because the justifications apply "with equal force to the
invocation of the right to remain silent, and because we have previously held that the
same rule should apply in both contexts, we hold that the Davis rule applies to invo-
cations of the right to remain silent."'6 The Seventh Circuit explained its decision to
follow Davis this way:
If an ambiguous request for counsel-a request that, if it were
more clear, would amount to a per se invocation of Fifth Amend-
ment rights-does not require the cessation of all questioning,
we do not believe that Davis permits our imposing such a rule on
any other ambiguous invocation of the right to silence.69
2. The State Courts
State court decisions follow a similar pattern to the federal: the vast majority of
states that have considered the question have applied the Davis rule to the right to
remain silent.70 No state that adopted Davis as the prevailing doctrine for the right
to counsel rejected it for the right to remain silent. In other words, only a few states
did not adapt Davis for invoking all Miranda rights; those states either have not yet
considered the issue or are the few states that rejected Davis altogether under their
state constitution.7
67 Id. at 1212.
68 Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1424 (1 1th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1086 (1995); see, e.g., United States v. Stepherson, 152 F. App'x 904,906 (1 th Cir. 2005).
69 United States v. Banks, 78 F.3d 1190, 1198 (7th Cir. 1996).
70 People v. Arroya, 988 P.2d 1124, 1131 (Colo. 1999) ("In so doing we follow the majority
of other states that have considered the application of the 'clear articulation rule' to the right
to remain silent."). See Appendix I for a listing of each state and the rules followed.
7' The following states do not require that an invocation of counsel must be made unam-
biguously because their state constitutions provide greater rights to a suspect than the Federal
Constitution. Hawaii: State v. Wallace, 94 P.3d 1275, 1286 (Haw. 2004); State v. Hoey, 881
P.2d 504,523 (Haw. 1994). Minnesota: State v. Risk, 598 N.W.2d 642,648-49 (Minn. 1999).
New Jersey: State v. Chew, 695 A.2d 1301, 1317-18 (N.J. 1997). West Virginia: State v.
Farley, 452 S.E.2d 50, 59 n.12 (W. Va. 1994). But see State v. Bradshaw, 457 S.E.2d 456,
470 (W. Va. 1995) (any doubt created by an ambiguous statement would be resolved in favor
of the police), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 872 (1995).
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Similar to the federal cases, the adoption of Davis by the state courts is typically
fairly perfunctory.72 With one exception, the courts did not address any of the possible
reasons why the rights perhaps should be treated differently.73 Rather, the approach of
the Supreme Court of Vermont was representative, when it simply declared, "Without
doubt, [the holding in Davis] applies equally to situations in which a defendant who
has waived his Miranda rights ambiguously invokes the right to remain silent during
the subsequent interrogation."74
B. Application of Davis-What Constitutes an Ambiguous Assertion?
How has the mandate to follow Davis been implemented? In other words, what
kind of statements have the courts found to be ambiguous and what kind of state-
ments have the courts found to invoke the right to remain silent? On the one hand,
if the courts have been "generous" in drawing the line between ambiguous and non-
ambiguous statements by finding many statements to be assertions of the right, there
may be less reason to lament the application of Davis. If, however, the courts have not
been sympathetic to uncertain, indirect language that is often employed in intimidating
settings, then the use of Davis is of greater concern. Moreover, if the courts have been
inconsistent in the determination of whether a statement is ambiguous, there is also
cause for alarm.
There are familiar patterns in the cases where the suspect's statements are found
to be ambiguous assertions of the right to remain silent."75 Statements made by suspects
72 See, e.g., State v. Gaspard, 709 So. 2d 213,220 (La. Ct. App. 1998) ("If the invocation
of the right to counsel must be unambiguous, then certainly the invocation of the right to remain
silent must also be unambiguous.").
"' One obvious exception was the analysis of the Wyoming Supreme Court, which ex-
pressed significant doubts about the application of the Davis rule to the right to remain silent
similar to those articulated in this Article, but ultimately determined that it need not decide
the issue since the officers here properly clarified the ambiguous invocation. Pefia v. State,
98 P.3d 857, 866-68 (Wyo. 2004).
74 State v. Bacon, 658 A.2d 54, 65 (Vt. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 837 (1995).
7 For a similar analysis with respect to the invoking the right to counsel, see Marcy Strauss,
Understanding Davis v. United States, 40 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1011 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss,
Understanding Davis]. In many ways, though, classifying and analyzing the right to remain
silent presented a more difficult challenge. At a minimum, virtually every comment in the right
to counsel cases involved the use of the word lawyer or attorney or counsel, and the only
question is whether that was sufficiently clear to constitute an invocation. In the right to
silence cases, that is not true-there are no magic words like "attorney or lawyer" that signal
a possible assertion, and the statements involve an almost infinite range of ideas, including
requests to be somewhere else or silence. Moreover, at times it may be difficult to determine
whether the suspect is invoking the right to counsel or the right to remain silent-and perhaps
the suspect may not be certain as well. For example, is a suspect who says, "I'm asserting my
rights," asserting both? Most courts would likely find that to be an assertion only of the right
to remain silent (at best). See Medley v. Commonwealth, 602 S.E.2d 411, 417-18 (Va. Ct.
2009]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
typically fit into one of the following categories: (1) questions concerning the right;
(2) use of modal verbs like maybe, might, or could; (3) hedges; (4) simply silence;
(5) requests to do something else besides talking; (6) temporally vague comments
about the willingness to talk; (7) comments that indicate a desire not to talk about
specific topics or not to say something incriminating; (8) comments that become
ambiguous because of other statements or conduct.
1. Questions Concerning the Right
One type of possible invocation of the right to counsel occurs when the suspect
asks about the right rather than directly asserting it. At times, the suspect appears
to be seeking the advice of the police: the suspect may ask if they think they should
remain silent or obtain a lawyer.76 But at other times the question appears to be a
fairly clear substitute for a direct assertion of the right. For example, the suspect may
ask: "I have the right to stop don't I ... answering questions?"77 Or, instead of
saying that they don't want to talk at this time, a suspect may "ask" if they could talk
later.78 Using questions, or even making statements with the voice raised at the end
is a frequent form of elocution for persons who find themselves in an intimidating
position or who feel powerless. 79 And in everyday parlance, using a question to make
a request is commonplace. For example, a school child might raise her hand and ask,
"Can I go the bathroom?" While it is possible that that child does not really want to
go the bathroom, and may be simply assessing if it is possible, virtually all would
assume that a "yes" answer would cause the child to leave the room. In other words,
it would appear clear to most that the child is saying, "I want to go to the bathroom-
is that ok?"
App. 2004). Of course, most suspects are totally unaware of the significant different conse-
quences of invoking one right versus the other. See Farley, 452 S.E.2d at 59-60 & n. 11.
76 See, e.g., Gilbert v. State, 198 S.W.3d 561, 566 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the
statement, "Do I need a lawyer or something?" was an ambiguous invocation of the right to
remain silent).
"7 People v. Moore, No. 239242,2003 WL 21771296, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. July 31,2003)
(holding that "So what do I have to do to get out of here? Cause I haven't sleep [sic] all day"
was not a request, let alone an unambiguous request to remain silent).
71 See Smith v. State, 236 S.W.3d 282,289-90 (Tex. App. 2007) (holding that the state-
ment, "Could I go upstairs because I'm hungry?" was ambiguous); see, e.g., Martin v.
Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 923-24 (11 th Cir. 1985) (finding, in a pre-Davis decision, that
the request, "Can't we wait until tomorrow," invoked the right to cut off questions), modified
in respects not relevant, 781 F.2d 185 (1 lth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 909 (1986).
79 Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, Cops and Robbers: Selective Literalism in
American Criminal Law, 38 L. & Soc'y REv. 229, 251-52 (2004). Professors Tiersma and
Solan point out that in other contexts, when the police phrase statements as questions, even
ambiguous questions, courts will view it as clear requests. Id. at 255. For example, in Schneloth
v. Bustamonte, the Supreme Court "held that the police officer, by asking 'Does the trunk
open?' had requested consent to search the trunk." Id.
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In the context of the interrogation room, however, questions like that are usually
deemed ambiguous. Take for example, the approach of the Minnesota Court of
Appeals involving a suspect, Gilmer, and the interrogator, Carlson:
Gilmer: Can I go?
Carlson: Uh?
Gilmer: Can I go?
Carlson: Sure you can. Cause-I have one more question I
wanted to ask you. About do you remember making a comment
how lucky that cop was?8°
Gilmer then continued to answer questions and eventually told Carlson that he called
the police officer lucky because he would have shot him if he had a gun.'
The court held that Gilmer' s requests to leave-twice saying, "Can I go?"--were
not unambiguous and unequivocal invocations of the right to silence. This conclu-
sion was buttressed by Gilmore's behavior after he asked to leave; because Gilmer
continued to answer questions, "he did not demonstrate a 'general refusal to answer
any of the questions the detective wanted to ask." 82
2. Use of Modal Verbs like Maybe, Might or Could
As predicted by critics of Davis, many suspects subjected to the intimidation
inherent in custodial interrogation employ modal verbs-indirect, tentative speech
patterns. Thus, suspects might say things like "I might not want to talk," or "Maybe
I'll stay quiet." Although there are not many cases along these lines, courts invariably
find these kinds of statements to be ambiguous. For example, one court found the
statement, "I'm not sure what I want to do," was ambiguous and thus, not an invo-
cation of the right to remain silent.83 Another found that a suspect's comment, "I want
to give ya'll [sic] a statement but I don't... I'd rather not be doing it. Another time
if we could man," was ambiguous and allowed the police to continue questioning.8
80 State v. Gilmer, No. CO-03-82, 2004 WL 333137, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 24,2004).
81 Id.
82 Id. at *3. This conclusion appears contrary to law-the subsequent answering of
questions after a possible invocation should not be used as evidence that the invocation was
ambiguous. Rather, it is a testament to the ability of the police, once they ignore an invocation,
to obtain the suspect's cooperation since most suspects would then believe they have no real
option. Of course Gilmer talked-he had twice asked to leave and was essentially ignored.
I discuss this phenomenon elsewhere as well. See infra Part IH.A.3.
83 State v. Morris, 880 P.2d 1244, 1253 (Kan. 1994); see People v. Furness, No. B183779,
2006 WL 2005481, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. July 19, 2006) (holding that the statement, "I'm think-
ing I might just want to keep my mouth shut... I don't know," was ambiguous; police also
asked clarifying questions); State v. Hassel, 696 N.W.2d 270, 274 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that the statement, "I don't know if I should speak to you," was ambiguous).
' State v. Reed, 809 So. 2d 1261, 1273-74 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
2009]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Perhaps the oddest interpretation of a modal verb involves one court's analysis of
the use of the word "can't." In a strange use of linguistic logic, the Michigan Court
of Appeals found that the trial court did not err in finding that a suspect, who, after
viewing a video, said, "I can't say anything more now, because that's blowing my
mind away," did not assert his right to remain silent.85 The court's reasoning:
[D]efendant's expression of his inability to respond to the alle-
gation based on shock and disbelief is not an unequivocal asser-
tion of the right to remain silent. Further, the fact that defendant
referred to his ability to respond to the allegations using the word
"can" [sic] and referenced his shock as the reason for being un-
able to speak further support the trial court's finding that defen-
dant was referring not to his desire to remain silent but to his
inability to respond to the charges in light of his shock.
86
The problem with the court's analysis is that the motive for the suspect in invoking
the right to remain silent is irrelevant. It could be from a "desire" not to speak or it
may not. In other words, a suspect who says, "I really, really want to speak to you, but
I won't," should be deemed to be invoking his right. The motive for not speaking-be
it a desire not to, the advice of attorney, fear, or even "shock"--is irrelevant.
3. Hedges
"'Hedges' are lexical expressions that function to attenuate the emphasis of a
statement, or to make it less precise."87 As will be discussed more fully later, Janet
Ainsworth and other scholars predicted that women and members of certain cultures
particularly use hedges when in custodial settings because they are not used to de-
manding outright and directly what they desire.88 Similarly, Professors Tiersma and
Solan noted that people use hedges not only when they are uncertain about some-
thing, but also as a means of expressing politeness or being deferential. 89 Thus, a
person might say things like "I think I should stop talking," or "I guess I won't talk,"
or "maybe I shouldn't talk" rather than say directly that they are not going to answer
any questions or "demanding" their rights. Although my survey of the case law was
not able to assess whether women are more likely to speak like this than men, it did
85 People v. Anderson, No. 265959, 2007 WL 1429631, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. May 15,
2007).
86 Id.
87 Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police
Interrogation, 103 YALEL.J. 259, 276 (1993); see Strauss, Understanding Davis, supra note
75, at 1041.
88 Ainsworth, supra note 87.
89 Tiersma & Solan, supra note 79, at 249-50.
[Vol. 17:773790
THE SOUNDS OF SILENCE
establish that whoever used these expressions was likely to be found to be making
an ambiguous request. For example, the Kansas Court of Appeals found that the
statement, "You all are scaring me I think, yeah, I shouldn't-say... anymore,"
was constitutionally indistinguishable from the ambiguous comment in Davis.9°
Another court found that the suspect's statement, "I don't think I can talk .... I
guess I don't want to discuss it right now," was ambiguous.9' Similarly, a suspect
who, when asked if he wanted to talk said, "Naw, I don't think so," was held to be
making an ambiguous request.
92
Another way suspects could "hedge" their comments without using terms like
"think," or "guess," is to "blame" the desire to remain silent on others. Again, the
court often deems these to be ambiguous requests. For example, one defendant, after
talking for a bit said, "from here on, I'm not supposed to talk about it. Mr. Stanfield
told me not to talk about the rest of this."93 The court held that the subsequent state-
ments were admissible because the prior statement was ambiguous (which the police
officers clarified).94
90 State v. Morfitt, 956 P.2d 719,725 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998); accord People v. Stitely, 108
P.3d 182, 195-96 (Cal. 2005) (holding that the statement, "I think it's about time for me to
stop talking," is ambiguous), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 865 (2005).
91 People v. Peracchi, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921, 924-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 901 (2001).
92 People v. Patterson, No. A103263, 2005 Cal. App. LEXIS 9594, at *37 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 21, 2005); see Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 200 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
statements, "I just don't think that I should say anything," and, "I need somebody that I can
talk to," did not constitute an unequivocal request to remain silent), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1283
(2000); State v. Holmes, 102 P.3d 406,414, 419-20 (Kan. 2004). In Holmes, after the suspect
said, "I think I'll just quit talking, I don't know," the police officer moved the interrogation
in another direction, thinking the suspect was just uneasy talking about a particular subject.
He asked, "would you like to talk about something else?" and the suspect said, "Yes." The
Court held the statement was ambiguous-it could be construed as not wanting to talk but
not knowing if he should stop, or as an invocation. Here, it was appropriate to clarify. Id.; see
also State v. Garbow, No. A04-149, 2005 WL 221676, at *1, *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 1,
2003) (holding that the statement, "I don't know," when asked if a suspect wanted to speak
was inherently ambiguous); State v. Wright, No. 07AP-154, 2007 WL 4564247, at *6-7
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2007) (holding that the statement, "You know, man, I really don't even
want to keep going through these questions and stuff man, because you all getting ready to
charge me with something. I don't know, man. You know what I am saying?" was
ambiguous, and police asked appropriate clarifying questions like "You don't want to answer
any more questions?"); cf. State v. Deen, 953 So. 2d 1057, 1058-59 (La. Ct. App. 2007)
(holding that defendant's statement, "Okay, if you're implying that I've done it, I wish to not
say any more. I'd like to be done with this. Cause that's just ridiculous. I wish I'd... don't
wish to answer any more questions," was ambiguous because it was conditioned on police
officer's implying that he committed the brutal assault).
9' Alvarez v. State, 890 So. 2d 389, 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
9 Id. at 393-94. While "clarifying," the police also told the suspect that this would be his
only opportunity to tell his side of the story. Id.
20091
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
4. Simply Silence
What if the suspect simply stays silent? Is that an invocation of the right? In one
way, it could be deemed the ultimate invocation-not only is the person saying what
they want to do, they are also doing it! On the other hand, the conclusion is compli-
cated because a person may pick and choose what to respond to, so it may be that
they have not yet found a topic they want to discuss. Not surprisingly, then, the courts
have reached conflicting conclusions with respect to silence. For example, one dis-
trict court held that the suspect had invoked the right to remain silent when he did not
answer any of the first set of questions in a twenty-minute period.9
Most courts, however, seem to deem silence, even lengthy silence, as ambiguous.
For example, a court of appeals held that the trial court was not clearly erroneous when
it held that a thirty- to forty-minute period of silence did not express an "unwillingness
to continue the questioning, but rather 'a time used by [the suspect] to redevelop his
strategy and decide how he wished to respond to the discovery of the receipt for the
bag of lime.' 96 Similarly, a court held that the suspect's statement that he would not
confess to something he did not do, that the police should "buckle up for the long
ride," accompanied by the suspect turning his chair away, closing his eyes, and re-
maining silent for two-and-one-half hours did not constitute a clear and unambigu-
ous assertion of the right to remain silent.97
5. Requests to Do Something Besides Talk
One of the difficult aspects of analyzing cases involving the right to remain silent
is the myriad of almost limitless ways to invoke the right. For example, a person may
inform the police that they do not want to talk by saying that they want to do some-
thing else instead.9 8 Or they may ask to speak to someone else-a mom, another
suspect-before speaking to the police.99 Almost invariably, the courts have found
" State v. Rossignol, 627 A.2d 524, 525-27 (Me. 1993).
96 Commonwealth v. Sicari, 752 N.E.2d 684, 695-96 (Mass. 2001), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 1142 (2002).
" Green v. Commonwealth, 500 S.E.2d 835, 837-38 (Va. Ct. App. 1998); see State v.
Ross, 552 N.W.2d 428, 432 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) ("[S]uspect's silence, standing alone, is
insufficient to unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent.").
98 See, e.g., State v. Gaspard, 709 So. 2d 213, 218,220 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
the statement, "I'm ready to go [to jail]," did not unambiguously invoke the right to remain
silent); State v. Curren, No. 04 CA 8, 2005 WL 1995101, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 16,
2005) (holding that a request to reschedule the conversation for another time, which was
denied by the police who said they "wanted the matter cleared up that day" did not constitute
an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent).
99 See, e.g., Davis v. State, No. AP-74393, 2007 WL 1704071, at *4-6 (Tex. Crim. App.
June 13, 2007) (holding that when a suspect asked to speak to his mom, to go home for an hour,
and then return and tell the truth was ambiguous and satisfied by police getting mom on phone
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these statements to be ambiguous. Thus, the Kansas Supreme Court held ambiguous
the suspect's statement: "And since we're not getting anywhere I just ask you guys
to go ahead and get this over with and go ahead and lock me up and let me go and deal
with Sedgwick County, I'm ready to go to Sedgwick County, let's go."' ° Such a
statement, according to the court, did not constitute an unequivocal statement that he
wished to remain silent.'' Similarly, the Florida Court of Appeals held that the sus-
pect, who three times said, "Just take me to jail," was making an ambiguous assertion
of the right to remain silent, and therefore the police did not have to stop question-
ing.'°2 Another court held that a female suspect who said, "Then put me in jail. Just
get me out of here. I don't want to sit here anymore, alright? I've been through enough
today," was ambiguous. 0 3 In so doing, the court indicated the high threshold level
it was establishing:
[A] suspect's claimed unequivocal invocation of the right to re-
main silent must be patent. The Ross rule allows no room for an
assertion that permits even the possibility of reasonable competing
inferences: there is no invocation of the right to remain silent if
any reasonable competing inference can be drawn.'
4
Under such a standard, it is not surprising that the court held that the suspect's osten-
sibly clear assertion was ambiguous. The court conceded that a reasonable interpre-
tation of the statement is that the suspect was invoking her right to remain silent, but
concluded that an equally reasonable interpretation was "that she was merely fencing
with [her interrogator] as he kept repeatedly catching her in either lies or at least dif-
fering versions of the events.' ' 5
Finally, and perhaps most disturbing, a court found no assertion of the right to
remain silent despite the persistent requests throughout the interrogation from a sus-
pect with diminished mental abilities to go home-"I want to go home to the house,
because suspect just wanted to reassure himself that his mom felt OK before continuing); see
also Draper v. State, No. 147, 2000, 2002 Del. LEXIS 51, at *3, *6-10 (Del. Jan. 28, 2002)
(holding that when a suspect requested to speak to his mom before he talked to the police was
an ambiguous statement, but under Delaware law, the court held police must clarify, not inter-
rogate, which they did not do, thus the statements elicited after this comment were suppressed).
'"o State v. Speed, 961 P.2d 13, 24 (Kan. 1998).
' ' Id.; see Smith v. State, 236 S.W.3d 282,289-90 (Tex. App. 2007) (holding that the state-
ments, "Man. Whatever's gonna happen, cause I'm just ready to go up there and eat... Could
I go upstairs because I'm hungry?" indicated only that the suspect was hungry and not that
he wanted to end the interrogation).
i02 Ford v. State, 801 So. 2d 318, 319-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), review denied, 821
So. 2d 292 (Fla. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1010 (2002).
103 State v. Markwardt, 742 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 556-57.
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man.... I'll come up to talk to you later because, man, I don't have time to think....
I gotta go home.... Can I go home now?"' 6 The court concluded:
His statements more accurately reflect a desire to have time to formulate
answers or an inquiry as to whether he would be allowed to go home if he
confessed rather than a request to terminate the interview. At most, Delao' s
statements are ambiguous as to his desire to terminate the interview.1 7
6. Temporally Vague Comments
Some suspects append a time limitation to their invocations. Thus, a suspect may
say, "I don't want to talk now." The word "now" is read by many courts as rendering
the invocation ambiguous. These courts have allowed further interrogation after a
"short break" because, these courts conclude, the suspect never demonstrated an over-
all desire not to speak to the police.' It was as though the suspect said, "hold on a
second, I'm happy to talk to you after I clear my throat."
This conclusion seems inexplicable to me because, given Mosley,"°9 every invo-
cation of the right to remain silent is temporal. Even a suspect who says, "I am invok-
ing my rights under Miranda and do not want to talk to you at all ever again," has an
implicit "now" attached to that statement, because Mosley allows the police to try
again. There is an inherent assumption that the suspect is invoking "for the moment,"
but that nonetheless, it is still an invocation. Thus, questioning should cease and any
subsequent interrogation should be analyzed under Mosley.
Instead, many courts considering comments like "I don't want to talk now," have
determined that the invocation itself was equivocal or momentary and thus no sort of
Mosley analysis is even necessary since the interrogation can simply continue (although
it's nice to give the suspect a quick break!)."0 For example, a recent court of appeals
"0 Delao v. State, No. 10-05-00323-CR, 2006 WL 3317718, at *4-5 (Tex. App. Nov. 15,
2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1128 (2008).
107 Id. at *5.
"' See, e.g., State v. Gilmer, No. CO-03-82, 2004 WL 333137, at *2-3 (Minn. Ct. App.
Feb. 24, 2004).
" See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
10 See Anderson v. Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1210-13 (9th Cir. 2005), rev'den banc, 516
F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. Cate v. Anderson, 129 S. Ct. 344 (2008)
(holding that the state court's decision that the following statement was ambiguous was not
unreasonable: "I don't even wanna talk about this no more. We can talk about it later or what-
ever. I don't want to talk about this no more.... I plead the fifth"). According to the appellate
court in Anderson, the police here also engaged in clarification, not continued interrogation,
by asking the suspect: "Plead the fifth. What's that?" Id. In another case, the suspect said,
"I really can't say no more right now.... My head is splitting.... I need some rest. I really
do," and the court held this statement did not invoke the right to remain silent, but simply that
the defendant felt that he was physically unable to continue. Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d
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held that a suspect's comment, "Not right now," was ambiguous as to whether the
suspect wants to talk after a "quick break.""' Thus, the re-interrogation after a short
period was held valid, not under Mosley or some other theory, but because there was
no clear invocation; the statement was ambiguous as to whether the suspect wanted to
speak at that point.112 Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the defen-
dant's statement, "I don't want to talk about it right now," operated to limit the defen-
dant's invocation of his right to remain silent to the moment and was equivocal." 13
Other courts similarly have found angry outbursts that included the intent not to
say anything indicated only a temporary-and thus ambiguous-assertion of the right
to remain silent. For example, when the suspect, after getting upset with the police
officer, said, "I'm not going to talk.... That's it. I shut up," the court concluded
that this statement "reflect[ed] only momentary frustration and animosity toward"
one of the officers and not an invocation of the right to remain silent."4 Likewise,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the suspect's statement, "I don't have to take
any more of your bullshit," accompanied by his walking out of the interview room
did not invoke the right to remain silent."5 Rather, the court sanctioned the re-
interrogation that occurred after a "cooling off period" because the suspect did not
specifically state that he wanted to stop answering questions." 6
244, 253, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Thus, the court found no problem with the police
response when the suspect said he could say no more: "Yes, you can.... It's got to come
out. It's going to kill you if it doesn't." Id. at 253; see also State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 935
(Utah 1998) (holding that the only reasonable interpretation of the suspect's statement, "I can't
even talk right now," was that "his emotions had temporarily overcome his ability to speak,"
and thus it was not an unambiguous assertion of right to remain silent); accord Franks v. State,
90 S.W.3d 771, 786-87 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that when a suspect with low IQ said, "I
don't want to talk anymore. I'm tired," it was ambiguous).
While most courts appear to find such statements ambiguous, not all reach that conclusion.
See, e.g., State v. Nelson, No. 9801001490, 1998 Del. Super. LEXIS 477, at * 11, *15-16
(Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 1998) (holding that the statement, "I have nothing else to say now,"
was an unambiguous invocation); State v. Astello, 602 N.W.2d 190, 196 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that the statements, "Well. I'm done. You're just repeating the same questions....
Well, you're done. I gotta go. I gotta go eat.... I'm done," were unambiguous but an admis-
sion of subsequent statements was harmless error); State v. Hukowicz, No. M1999-00073-
CCA-R9-CD, 2000 WL 1246430, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2000) ("[A]lthough the
defendant did not stand mute or assert that he did not want to answer any questions, we find
ample evidence to support the trial court's finding that the defendant invoked his right to remain
silent [when he told the detective] that he could not comment, and that although he wanted to
comment, 'he knew better."').
"' State v. Bieker, 132 P.3d 478,481-82 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).
112 Id.
"i State v. Sabetta, 680 A.2d 927, 932 (R.I. 1996).
"" People v. Jennings, 760 P.2d 475 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
" State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 282, 284 (Minn. 1995).
16 Id. at 285; see also State v. Gilmer, No. CO-03-82, 2004 WL 333137, at *2-3 (Minn.
Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2004).
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7. Statements Indicating a Desire Not to Talk About Certain Subjects or with a
Particular Person
In a similar vein, some courts interpret what looks like an unambiguous invocation
to be ambiguous because it did not indicate a generalized wish to remain silent but
rather simply suggested a desire to change subjects or interrogators.' 17 For example,
one court held that a defendant's statement, "I don't want to talk about it any more, it
hurts too much," was not invoking the right to remain silent but expressing a desire
not to continue talking about the murder. ' 8 Such a conclusion is especially likely
to be reached if the suspect says something like "I don't want to talk about that or
it."" 9 But even when the comment seems more encompassing, courts often suggest
,17 See, e.g., State v. Golphin, 533 S.E.2d 168 (N.C. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 931
(2001). There, the suspect's statement that "he didn't want to say anything about the jeep. He
did not know who it was or he would have told us" was not unambiguously invoking right
to remain silent. Id. at 225. Rather the suspect was suggesting that if he knew he would have
said and thus further questioning on the jeep was perfectly acceptable. Id. Of course, even a
change of subject does not offer much protection to the suspect. For example, in one case when
the suspect said he "had nothing to say" to the detective, the detective interpreted that as a
desire not to say anything on the subject asked about (a particular robbery). Smith v. State, 915
So. 2d 692, 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). The detective then asked him if he had committed
any other robberies, and the defendant responded, "[N]o other than the one today." Id. at 693
n. 1. The court held the statement inadmissible on the ground that the suspect had invoked his
rights. Id. at 693.
18 State v. Fritschen, 802 P.2d 558, 567-68 (Kan. 1990); accord State v. Jackson, 839
N.E.2d 362, 373 (Ohio 2006) (holding that the statements "I don't even like talking about
it man.., cause you know what I mean, it's fucked for me, man .... I told you.., what
happened, man, .. . I mean, I don't even want to, you know what I'm saying, discuss no
more about it, man .... were ambiguous), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1182 (2006); cf. People v.
Troutman, 366 N.E.2d 1088 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (finding a suspect's statement that she was
not going to confess did not invoke the right to remain silent but just indicated that she did not
want to incriminate herself); Vargas v. State, No. 01-03-00870-CR, 2005 WL 729460, at
*3-4 (Tex. App. Mar. 31, 2005) (holding that when a fifteen-year-old said twice, "I don't want
to do this," the statement was ambiguous because it was reasonable to believe it meant that
he did not want to relive the gruesome details of the death); Milburn v. State, No. 03-02-00458-
CR, 2004 WL 210620, at *5 (Tex. App. Feb. 5, 2004) (holding that "I don't have nothing to
say" was ambiguous), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1064 (2005). But see United States v. Poole,
794 F.2d 462,465-67 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding pre-Davis that when a defendant stated he had
"nothing to talk about" he invoked his right to remain silent); United States v. Stewart, 51
F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1142-45 (D. Kan. 1999) (holding that a defendant invoked his right to
remain silent when he said he did "not want to talk about a robbery," and "I don't want to
talk to any of you motherfuckers"), affd, 215 F.3d 1338 (10th Cir. 2000).
119 See, e.g., People v. Silva, 754 P.2d 1070, 1083-84 (Cal. 1988) (holding that the state-
ment, "I really don't want to talk about that," did not amount to an invocation of Miranda,
but instead was an unwillingness to talk about certain subjects); Owen v. State, 862 So. 2d
687 (Fla. 2003) (holding that when a suspect said, "I'd rather not talk about it.... I don't want
to talk about it," the statement was ambiguous); State v. Marden, 673 A.2d 1304, 1309-10
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it is just in response to the most immediate question. For example, a court held that
the suspect's statement, "I'm not saying anything right now," was ambiguous because
the statement "only indicated an unwillingness to talk about certain subjects. At
most it sought to alter the course of the detective's questions, not stop the interview
altogether."' 120 In another case, the suspect who answered a lengthy question, and then
concluded, "So that's all I got to say," was deemed ambiguous because "[ilt could
(Me. 1996) (holding that the defendant's response of"no comment" to several questions was
ambiguous-"[h]is responses viewed individually only indicated his desire not to answer the
particular question asked, not that he wanted the questioning to stop"); State v. Crawford, No.
A04-566, 2005 WL 757582, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2005) (holding that the defendant's
statement,"I don't know nothin' about it, so I don't got nothin' to say about it," in response to
whether he sold amphetamines was not an assertion of the right to remain silent, but was in-
stead a denial that he sold drugs); Ramos v. State, No. 04-04-00784-CR, 2006 WL 1232896
(Tex. App. May 10, 2006), rev'd, 245 S.W.3d 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding that the
statement, "I don't want to talk about it," was ambiguous because it could just be a desire not
to talk about a particular subject); State v. Bacon, 658 A.2d 54, 66 (Vt. 1995) ("A defendant
may express an unwillingness to discuss certain subjects without indicating a desire to termi-
nate an interrogation already in progress."); Hale v. Commonwealth, No. 2382-04-4, 2005
WL 2738306, at * 1 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2005) (holding the statement, "that's probably really
all I can say," was ambiguous); State v. Fitzgerald, No. 56952-0-I, 2007 WL 1241518, at *2
(Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2007) (determining that a suspect's comment, "I'd rather not answer
that," and subsequent silence in response to questions and turning away from police officers,
did not "indicate that he wished to remain silent generally"). But see United States v. Reid, 211
F. Supp. 2d 366, 372 (D. Mass. 2002) ("I have nothing else to say" was a sufficiently "pellucid
invocation of [the defendant's] right to remain silent .. "); United States v. Stewart, 51 F.
Supp. 2d 1136, 1142-45 (D. Kan. 1999) (holding that "Not want[ing] to talk about a robbery,"
and "I don't want to talk to you mother-flicker" were unambiguous), reconsidered in part,
51 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Kan. 1999), afftd, 215 F.3d 1338 (10th Cir. 2000); State v. Day, 619
N.W.2d 745,750 (Minn. 2000) (holding that the statement, "I don't want to tell you guys any-
thing to say about me in court," was an unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of the right
to remain silent); People v. Douglas, 778 N.Y.S.2d 622, 623 (App. Div. 2004) (holding that
the statement, "I have nothing further to say," was an invocation of rights); Commonwealth
v. Chen, No. K101486, 2002 WL 31803389, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 7, 2002) (holding that
"'I do not want to talk about it' cannot be viewed as anything other than an invocation of his
right to remain silent" when stated in the context where follow up questions were about same
topic). Cf. State v. Teidemann, 162 P.3d 1106, 1111 (Utah 2007) (holding that the statement,
"I don't want to talk about it," was a clear invocation with respect to questions concerning
a female murder victim; all of the defendant's responses to police questions concerning the
female victim were inadmissible).
120 People v. Bates, No. D045113, 2005 WL 3462243, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 19,
2005); cf. State v. King, 708 A.2d 1014, 1016 (Me. 1998) (holding that when a defendant
said that he did not want to talk without a particular detective present, then said, "I'm just
saying, you know.... I ain't saying nothing," it was ambiguous); Zelaya v. State, No. 06-
05-00251-CR, 2006 WL 2689911, at *4 (Tex. App. Sept. 21, 2006) (holding that when
suspect was asked if he wanted to talk and he said, "No, I'll listen, okay?" and "listen to you
now but I have to see," it was ambiguous and simply meant that he would decide whether
to answer particular questions).
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just have easily been interpreted as a statement that he had finished his explanation
of the matter."''
Other times, the courts depict the statement as ambiguous because it merely indi-
cates a desire to speak to someone else, not to stop talking altogether. Thus, a sus-
pect's comments, "Well, man you guys, do I have to talk to you guys?" was described
by the court as indicating only unease with the trend of the questioning or an un-
willingness to respond to a particular interrogator. '22
The problem with such an interpretation is that it makes it almost impossible for
a suspect to assert the right to remain silent after the waiver of rights. A suspect in
the midst of an interrogation who decides that he no longer wants to talk-a choice
embraced in Miranda-will almost always make this request in response to a ques-
tion.123 If a suspect's statement after being asked a question-"Ok, that's it, I'm
done talking"--will inevitably be interpreted as only expressing a desire not to
answer that particular question, the police are then free to ignore the comment by
asking about something else (and working their way back to that topic!).'24 A
suspect who felt he had asserted his right to end the interrogation but was ignored
will now be convinced that any further attempt to assert his rights will be futile. No
wonder suspects so often not only continue to respond to questions, but often soon
thereafter make incriminating statements.'25
1 State v. McCorkendale, 979 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Kan. 1999). The police officer ignored
the statement and continued questioning. See id.
122 People v. Lopez, No. A101889, 2004 WL 2378396, at * 3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 22,2004).
But see United States v. Stewart, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1143 (D. Kan. 1999) (holding that a
defendant invoked his right to remain silent when he said that he did not want to talk about a
robbery and stated, "I don't want to talk to you mother-fuckers"), reconsidered in part, 51
F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Kan. 1999), affid, 215 F.3d 1338 (10th Cir. 2000); Ramos v. State, 245
S.W.3d 410,416 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding that any reasonable police officer would
construe suspect's statement-"I don't want to talk to you .... I don't want to talk about it
anymore"--as unambiguous).
123 See, e.g., Lopez, 2004 WL 2378396, at *3.
124 That is assuming the courts even require the police to change the subject. That is not
at all clear, although a change certainly seems to assuage the reviewing court. Of course, the
police then can easily work their way back to the subject after an appropriate period of time.
125 See, e.g., State v. Erdahl, No. 01-0830, 2002 WL 31529174, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.
Nov. 15, 2002). In Erdahl, the court held that the statement, "I don't want to talk about it,"
was not an invocation of the right to remain silent, but was a desire not to talk about his rela-
tionship with his father, which was the topic at the time; the police officer was therefore free
to ignore it and the officer here did. The police officer asked, "You are sorry, though, aren't
you?"; Erdahl said he was and then confessed to sexual abuse, stabbing, and mutilation. Id.
The ease with which suspects can be persuaded to change their minds is also demonstrated by
the behavior described in Dooley v. State, 743 So. 2d 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). The defen-
dant, after being read his rights was asked if he wanted to waive them. Id. at 67. He said, "Urn,
I don't wish to waive my rights." Id. The police then continued saying:
By waiving your rights now doesn't mean that you waive them in the
future. All you're saying here now is that you're talking to me without
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Judge McKeown, dissenting in Anderson v. Terhune, recognized the potentially
devastating impact that finding an invocation is limited to a specific topic can entail.126
In Anderson v. Terhane, a panel of the Ninth Circuit had held that the police properly
treated the suspects comment, "I plead the Fifth," to be ambiguous, and that the police
in any event were justified in asking clarifying questions to determine what precisely
the suspect wanted to talk about. 127 Judge McKeown first rejected the notion that "I
plead the Fifth" was ambiguous: "Nothing was ambiguous about the statement ....
This effort to keep the conversation going was almost comical. The officer knew what
'I plead the Fifth' meant."1 28 Moreover, and most significant, the judge criticized
the notion of "clarifying" questions on the assumption that "I plead the Fifth" only
applied to a particular topic:
[E]very time a suspect unequivocally invokes the right to remain
silent, the police can ask follow-up questions to clarify whether he
really, really wants to invoke the right and to parse the subject
matter-"what specifically do you not want to talk about?" The
majority's holding allows the police to turn the Fifth Amendment
into a game of "twenty questions," permitting the police to con-
tinue the interrogation and forcing the suspect to take a multiple
choice quiz. Such a practice is tantamount to endless re-interro-
gation.... The net result is that... [it] allow[s] "the authorities
through badgering or overreaching... [to] wear down the accused
and persuade him to incriminate himself."' 29
Upon reargument before the Ninth Circuit en banc, Judge McKeown's arguments
prevailed. 30 In February of 2008, Judge McKeown wrote the majority opinion revers-
ing the original appellate decision. 31 I plead the Fifth" was finally found to plead
the Fifth.
132
the presence of an attorney. If one is required later on, if that's your wish,
one can be appointed to you. Do you understand that?
Id. Suspect then said, "Right. Urn, I'm going to talk to you." Id. The questioning continued and
the suspect soon confessed. Id. The court held that Davis only applies post-waiver, see infra
notes 186-87 and accompanying text, and that here there was no valid waiver. Dooley, 743
So. 2d at 68-69. But it aptly demonstrates how easily the police can "persuade" a suspect to
change his or her mind.
126 Anderson v. Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1217 (9th Cir. 2006) (McKeown, J., dissenting),
rev'd en banc, 516 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. Cate v. Anderson, 129
S. Ct. 344 (2008).
127 Id. at 1210, 1213 (majority opinion).
128 Id. at 1216.
129 Id. at 1217-18 (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984)).
130 Anderson, 516 F.3d 781.
131 Id. at 784.
132 id.
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8. Comments That Are Seemingly Clear but Become Ambiguous Given Other
Comments or Conduct
Some courts have held that a seemingly clear, direct invocation was ambiguous
under the circumstances. For example, in one case, a suspect responded, "no sir,"
when asked if he was willing to speak to the interrogating officer during the final
taped interview.133 The interrogators tried to clarify the response, and the suspect then
agreed to talk. The trial court held that the attempt to clarify was unlawful because
the invocation was clear and unambiguous. 134 The court of appeals disagreed:
Since Pitts had just agreed to talk with them, the officers would
understandably be surprised or confused by the "no sir" response.
When viewed in the context of Pitts' immediately preceding agree-
ment to talk with the officers, a "reasonable police officer in the
circumstances" would have been justified in believing either that
Pitts had misunderstood the question, that Pitts had misspoken
in response to the question, or that the officer had misunderstood
the response. The ambiguity or uncertainty arose not from the
words of the response-which in themselves admittedly are not
ambiguous--or from Pitts' "subsequent responses to continued
police questioning" but from "the circumstances leading up to"
Pitts' utterance of that response.135
1 State v. Pitts, 936 So. 2d 1111, 1120-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
134 Id. at 1122.
135 Id. at 1130-31 (citations omitted); accord Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1102
n.5 (1 th Cir. 1995); State v. Murphy, 747 N.E.2d 765, 779 (Ohio 2001) (holding that the
statement, "I'm ready to quit talking, and I'm ready to go home, too," was ambiguous; although
the first part could seem like an unambiguous invocation, the second part made it equivocal
because it meant that the suspect really just wanted to be released which might require that he
keep talking to persuade the police of his innocence). But see the cases where "no" means "no."
In Green v. State, the defendant said, "I don't want to talk." Green v. State, 570 S.E.2d 207,
210 (Ga. 2002). In response, the police officer tried to persuade him to talk, saying, "Just hear
me out. It's gonna get to a point where you're gonna be going, 'Shit, maybe I should have said
this, and maybe I should have said that."' Id. The defendant did start to talk. The trial court had
found that there had been no assertion of rights; the suspect had engaged in "mere banter" with
the police! Id. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed. Id.; see also People v. Hernandez,
840 N.E.2d 1254, 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that a defendant invoked the right when,
after being read his rights and asked if he wanted to talk to them now, he said, "No, not no
more"); State v. Marshall, 642 N.W.2d 48,53 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the defendant
saying, "No. I don't wish to say anything," after being read her Miranda rights was unequiv-
ocal); Simpson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 855, 858 (Tex. App. 2007) (holding that the statement,
"No. I don't even want to talk about it'll because-it'll really tell," was unambiguous and
questions should have immediately ceased).
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Some courts, moreover, have used the fact that the suspect proceeded to answer
questions to establish that the suspect's "invocation" was ambiguous. For example,
the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that a suspect's repeated comments dur-
ing an interrogation--"You can't make me say nothing," and "Do I need to get a
lawyer?"-were ambiguous.'36 "Danielle's inquiry about an attorney was, at best,
ambiguous. It could have been seeking advice from the officers, rather than a
request for counsel. Similarly, her comments about not saying anything were
equally unclear, especially since she continued to respond to the officers' ques-
tions."'137 If the fact that the suspect continued to answer questions after an invoca-
tion casts retrospective doubt on the nature of the invocation, the right to remain
silent becomes an empty one. The police could render virtually any invocation
ambiguous by ignoring it, since most suspects would likely keep responding once
their attempt to remain silent was unsuccessful.
A similarly troubling approach was taken by the court in State v. Whipple when
it held that a suspect's statement, "I don't wanta say man... I don't wanta say that, I
don't want to.... NO MORE, NO MORE," was ambiguous in light of all the circum-
stances, including the fact that the suspect had voluntarily come to the station house:
[T]he Court is abundantly satisfied that defendant was not invok-
ing or attempting to invoke any right to silence .... His words
136 State v. Greybull, 579 N.W.2d 161, 163 (N.D. 1998).
I d. (emphasis added); accord State v. Griffith, No. 2001-T-0136, 2003 WL 22994540,
at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2003) (holding statements like "I'm done," and "You got what
you wanted. Okay?" were ambiguous assertions and that such ambiguity was confirmed when
the suspect continued to answer questions); see Cuervo v. State, 929 So. 2d 640, 641-42 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006), decision quashed, 967 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 2007). The defendant said, "No,
I do not want to declare anything. I just-I do not want to declare anything," after being read
his rights and was asked if he wanted to talk about the matter. The court used subsequent dis-
cussion to render this statement ambiguous. Id.; see also State v. Robertson, 712 So. 2d 8, 31
(La. 1998) (holding defendant's, "uh huh," when police officer said, "[S]o you don't want
to say no more about what happened over there at them old people's house," was not an invo-
cation of right to remain silent; defendant was willing to talk to authorities as indicated by the
fact that he continued to answer questions), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 882 (1998); State v. Chesson,
856 So. 2d 166, 183 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that when a police officer said, "Are you
telling me you don't want to talk to me any more, John?" and John said, "Not right now. Y'all
tryin' to pressure this on me," was not an invocation of the right to remain silent but a statement
that he had no more to say and that he continued to speak freely with the police); Hargrove v.
State, 162 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. App. 2005) (holding that the statement, "Let's just terminate
it... Why should we go on because I'll be spinning my wheels. You're spinning your wheels,"
was ambiguous because defendant never explicitly answered police officer's question whether
he wanted to stop now and continued answering questions); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 518
S.E.2d 330, 333 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the statement, "I ain't got shit to say to
y'all," was ambiguous when the defendant later volunteered information); Commonwealth
v. Cupp, Nos. 30688, 30689, 30690, 2004 WL 2391944, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 21, 2004)
(stating that defendant's, "no," after being asked whether he wanted to make a statement could
mean that he didn't want to make a statement, not that he'd be unwilling to answer questions).
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clearly appear to be... an expression of disbelief in the events of
the day, of an unwillingness, albeit passing, to confront reality.
Further, it is inconsistent that defendant would present himself to
the Sheriffs Office, request an audience with an officer, ramble
for an hour, and then say he did not want to talk to anybody.
138
Such a position as that expressed by these courts is troubling on a number of
grounds. Miranda clearly protects the suspect's right to talk and then change his
mind. 139 It is emphatically not inconsistent to agree to talk and then, after talking,
decide to stop. That is the essence of the Miranda right granting to the suspect some
control over the interrogation. Under the courts' reasoning, a clear invocation after a
waiver would always be deemed ambiguous because it is inherently inconsistent with
the fact that the suspect had agreed at one point to talk."4°
III. A MISTAKEN APPLICATION: THE PROBLEMS WITH APPLYING DAVIS TO THE
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
Drawing upon the descriptions of how courts have applied the "clear invocation"
rule, this section argues against the application of that rule to the right to remain silent
for several reasons. First, the rule in Davis is simply wrong and should be overruled
138 State v. Whipple, 5 P.3d 478, 483 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000); see Marshall v. State, 210
S.W.3d 618, 628 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (holding that a suspect's, "No sir," in response to
a question as to whether suspect agreed to talk to police was ambiguous because suspect had
contacted the police about talking), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 87 (2007).
Not only did the court in Whipple misconstrue Miranda, it also indulged in some pop
psychology:
[W]e conclude that an objective view of the facts would lead a reason-
able police officer to conclude that Whipple was merely having a dif-
ficult catharsis.., needing to express himself, but not having an easy
time coming to grips with the reality that he had bludgeoned his wife to
death with a hammer.
Whipple, 5 P.3d at 484. The willingness of the courts to take a seemingly clear invocation
and use "pop psychology" to recast it as ambiguous was also evident in a recent decision of
the Seventh Circuit. See United States v. Sherrod, 445 F.3d 980 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1230 (2007). In that case, a suspect told the police that he was "not going to talk
about nothin'." Id. at 982. The court dismissed it as ambiguous: "[It was] as much a
taunt---even a provocation-as it [was] an invocation of the right to remain silent." Id. What
makes this a taunt-and what would ever differentiate any assertion of a desire to remain
silent from such a "taunt"-is never made clear. Accord State v. Lockhart, 830 A.2d 433,
443 (Me. 2003) ("'I don't know,' 'I can't do this,' 'I can't, don't ask, don't,' 'I want to go
to sleep'---could be ... understood to express Lockhart's internal conflict and pain in being
asked to recount what had happened.").
139 See Whipple, 5 P.3d at 482 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444-45 (1966)).
140 Id.
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whether with respect to asserting the right to counsel or the right to remain silent.
Second, even if Davis may be appropriate for determining invocation of the right to
counsel, it is an inappropriate standard for determining whether a valid assertion of
the right to remain silent has been made. Both as a matter of law and as a matter of
policy, courts should not apply the Davis rule to the right to remain silent. The appli-
cation of Davis, in conjunction with other rules regarding the right to remain silent,
has a synergistic effect that is undesirable. In other words, the combination of Davis
with Mosley and some other post-Miranda decisions eviscerates the protections of
Miranda. Finally, even if Davis is appropriate for assessing invocations of both
Miranda rights, it should only be applied to post-waiver invocations.
A. Davis Was Wrongly Decided: Interpreting Ambiguous Invocations as No
Invocation at All Is Inconsistent with the Premise of Miranda
The Court in Davis construed ambiguity as the functional equivalent of saying
nothing-of no invocation at all. Given that no one can be certain as to the meaning
of an unclear or indirect invocation, the question really becomes, what are the costs
of assuming it is an assertion of the right versus the risks of assuming it is not?
Where, in other words, should the presumption lie: in potentially protecting some-
one who may not desire protection, or in not extending protection to someone who
is trying to assert their rights?
There are three reasons why the presumption might favor viewing an ambiguous
statement as an irrelevancy and, thus, allow the police to continue with the interro-
gation. First, that position may accurately reflect what the suspect wants. In other
words, the ambiguous statement most likely reflects true equivocation-a person is
unsure, unclear, and undecided about whether to make up their mind. The suspect
has not yet decided that he wants to remain silent. Thus, continued questioning is
not inconsistent with his desires. Second, if we are uncertain about what a statement
means, law enforcement interests dictate that the interrogation should proceed.
Requiring police officers to construe every ambiguous request as an invocation
would thwart the effort to solve crime by obtaining incriminating statements. Third,
the costs of construing an ambiguous statement as an invocation outweigh any
benefit that might be incurred if the ambiguous invocation is deemed an assertion
of a Miranda right. There are no significant consequences to ignoring such
comments-to treating such comments as though the suspect were asking for a glass
of water. After all, if the suspect ever makes up his mind to remain silent, he can
unambiguously and clearly assert his rights.
None of these arguments are persuasive when closely examined. As more fully
developed below, the most reasonable (or at least as reasonable) interpretation of an
ambiguous statement is that it reflects an attempt by the suspect, to the best of their
ability given the inherently intimidating circumstances, to assert his or her rights.
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Moreover, the cost of treating an ambiguous statement as an invocation is minimal,
at least with respect to the right to remain silent. Finally, the costs of ignoring a pos-
sible invocation are grave for any possible protection of the suspect's right. Thus, I
think the answer was evident at the time of Miranda and even clearer now: in the
face of ambiguity, the presumption should lie in favor of protecting the suspect's
rights. An ambiguous invocation should not be ignored; it should either constitute
an invocation of rights or, at worst, be clarified.
1. An Ambiguous Statement Most Likely Reflects the Suspect's Intent to Assert
the Right to Remain Silent
Courts reasonably could decide that ambiguity should not count as an invocation
of rights because it isn't intended to be; persons who ambiguously "talk" about a
lawyer, or make some comment about not talking do not really intend to assert those
rights and should not be treated as though they did. Consideration of this first issue
requires a careful probing about the likely meaning of an ambiguous statement.
Ambiguity in the context of a custodial interrogation means one of three things:
(a) The person is uncertain and truly does not know what he wants to do;
(b) The person wants a lawyer or wants to remain silent, but, because of the
inherently intimidating circumstances or because of his cultural back-
ground, is unable to convey that intent in a more clear-cut fashion;
(c) The person wants to assert the right, but is afraid of the repercussions,
and, thus, hedges his comments.
The Davis majority, and those courts that apply it for the right to remain silent,
implicitly embrace the first possibility. 4 ' It is not only acceptable but also desirable
to ignore an ambiguous statement because such a statement is merely the suspect
"thinking out loud" about something that he has not yet committed to. It is just as
likely that such a person does not want a lawyer or wants to keep talking, and thus to
construe it as an invocation is unjustified.
But it is at least as plausible, if not more plausible, that a suspect who ambigu-
ously invokes his or her rights is, albeit imperfectly, attempting to invoke one or more
rights. '42 The ambiguity does not reflect uncertainty, but rather is a function of the cul-
tural background of the suspect, combined with the inherent pressures of interrogation.
' Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
142 See, e.g., David Aram Kaiser & Paul La Flein, Reconstructing Davis v. United States:
Intention and Meaning in Ambiguous Requestsfor Counsel, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 737,
758 (2005) (noting that the kind of statement required in Davis "is the sort of formulistic state-
ment no actual person other than a lawyer would ever utter. In ordinary life, of course, state-
ments of desire are considered perfectly clear even when they are much less blunt.... [In
actual linguistic practice, statements like] '[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer' may in reality
simply reflect the way ordinary people are inclined to express requests, particularly requests
directed to persons in authority").
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Numerous experts have voiced fear that Davis's requirement would operate to the
disadvantage of many criminal suspects who, because of culture, youth, gender, or
inexperience, refrain from making specific demands of the police. As Justice Souter
noted in his concurrence in Davis:
[C]riminal suspects ... "thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere
and run through menacing police interrogation procedures,"
would seem an odd group to single out for the Court's demand
of heightened linguistic care. A substantial percentage of them
lack anything like a confident command of the English language,
many are "woefully ignorant" and many more will be sufficiently
intimidated by the interrogation process or overwhelmed by the un-
certainty of their predicament that the ability to speak assertively
will abandon them.'43
Justice Souter's concerns have been echoed by scholars who prophesied that the
Davis rule would have a disproportionate effect on minorities, women, and the power-
less. Most prominent is the work of Professor Janet Ainsworth whose research co-
gently supports the second hypothesis: that a person ambiguously asserts his rights
because cultural factors and/or an intimidating environment inherently lead to equiv-
ocation.'44 As Professor Ainsworth wrote:
discrete segments of the population-particularly women and
ethnic minorities-are far more likely than others to adopt indirect
speech patterns. An indirect mode of expression is characteristic
of the language used by powerless persons, both those who are
members of certain groups that have historically been powerless
within society as well as those who are powerless because of the
particular situation in which they find themselves. Because crim-
inal suspects confronted with police interrogation may feel power-
less, they will often attempt to invoke their rights by using speech
patterns that the law currently refused to recognize. 145
143 Davis, 512 U.S. at 469-70 (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
'" Ainsworth, supra note 87, at 261.
45 Id.; see C. Antoinette Clarke, Say It Loud: Indirect Speech and Racial Equality in
the Interrogation Room, 21 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REv. 813, 820-21 (1999); Floralynn
Einesman, Confessions and Culture: The Interaction of Miranda and Diversity, 90 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1,32-33 (1999); Adam G. Finger, Comment, How Do You Get a Lawyer
A round Here? The Ambiguous Invocation of a Defendant's Right to Counsel Under Miranda
v. Arizona, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 1041, 1061-62 (making a similar argument that the use of
indirect language is preferred in Asian society: "[A] member of an Asian society would be
much less likely to assert his rights in the face of authority. To do so would be in contravention
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In sum, it is inevitable that people react to custodial interrogation with some
degree of intimidation."4 It is normal to respond to intimidation by sounding meek
or tentative rather than precise, clear, and assertive. 47 The tendency to use equivocal
language during custodial interrogation is reinforced by cultural and gender norms
that make such tentative elocution especially likely for certain groups. 4 8 Thus, it is
not surprising that studies demonstrate that the people who are most likely to clearly
assert their rights are "hardened" criminals who may be less intimidated and more
accustomed to the custodial interrogation setting."'
The examples provided in Part H demonstrate how suspects are likely to use
hedges, modal verbs, or imprecise statements rather than assert their rights in an un-
ambiguous manner during custodial interrogation. Although in a small proportion
of cases the courts found the assertion unambiguous, in the vast majority of cases re-
ported, no assertion was found.50 Of course, drawing definitive empirical conclusions
from studying appellate decisions is not only difficult but misleading because it may
be that the invocations that are truly clear-"I am asserting my right to remain silent
and do not want to answer any questions of any kind"-never make their way into the
case law.15 "[S]ince very few cases go to trial and fewer still are appealed, the pool
of appellate cases is unlikely to be a representative sample."'' 52 But my "rough"
of a societal standard that is firmly ingrained within the Asian culture.... The use of an
indirect method of speech is preferred in Asian society and is considered sophisticated");
Samira Sadeghi, Comment, Hung up on Semantics: A Critique of Davis v. United States, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 313, 330 (1995).
146 Indeed, I make the argument elsewhere that simply interacting with the police, even
in a non-custodial situation is inherently intimidating and coercive. See Marcy Strauss,
Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211 (2001).
147 See Ainsworth, supra note 87, at 283.
148 See id. at 284-85.
149 "There is evidence that suspects with felony records are much more likely to invoke
silence than those whose records are clear." Duke, supra note 2, at 558 n.30; see Richard A.
Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 286 (1996).
IS0 Of course, the mere fact that different courts reach such different conclusions in seem-
ingly similar situations is troubling; suspects should not be treated differently with respect to
these critical rights depending on what court or police department evaluates the request. My
recent study of the ways in which people invoke the right to counsel also lends support to the
scholarly conclusion that persons subject to custodial interrogation tend to phrase things in
indirect, equivocal fashion. See Strauss, Understanding Davis, supra note 75. For example,
the use of modal verbs like "maybe," "might," or "could," are commonly employed when refer-
encing the right to counsel. Even more common is the use of hedges-"lexical expressions that
function to attenuate the emphasis of a statement, or to make it less precise." Ainsworth, supra
note 87. Thus, a person might say, "I think I want an attorney," or "I guess I shouldn't say
anything." Or a person might phrase a request as a question: "Can I get a lawyer?" These are
routinely treated by the courts as ambiguous requests. See Strauss, Understanding Davis, supra
note 75, at 1040-47.
's George C. Thomas III, StoriesAbout Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1962--64 (2004).
152 Id. at 1962.
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conclusion based upon a reading of the cases is buttressed by the clearly established
empirical evidence that very few people assert their rights, and almost no one invokes
the right to remain silent after a waiver." 3
Thus, my point is that in many, perhaps even most, of the cases described in Part
HI, where the court found the assertion to be ambiguous, the suspects were attempt-
ing to invoke their right to remain silent. ' 5 Scientific data and experts in linguistics
support such a conclusion. 5 Common sense, moreover, also compels such an inter-
pretation. The use of hedges or modal verbs and even questions in most everyday
situations are typically treated as unambiguous. For example, if a customer tells a
waitress, "I think I'll take a tuna sandwich," virtually all would interpret that as a clear
enough request for a tuna sandwich. Indeed, it would be deemed the epitome of rude-
ness if the waitress treated it as an ambiguous request and responded, "Well, do you
want one or not?" A boss who asks her secretary for coffee by stating, "can I get a cup
of coffee?" would assume that coffee was forthcoming without further clarification. I5 6
Yet, in the hostile, frightening environment of an interrogation setting, the police can
ignore such comments or treat them as though the suspect asked about the weather.
In addition to cultural and background factors explaining why an intended asser-
tion of rights may be phrased ambiguously, suspects may also equivocate out of fear
of repercussions. Although clearly related to the second theory, I am referring here
to a slightly different phenomenon, especially with respect to the right to remain silent.
One of the problems with the Miranda warnings is that they fail to inform the sus-
pect that if the suspect invokes his right to remain silent, no adverse inferences will
be drawn. 57 Suspects are never told (or at least are not required to be told) that their
refusal to talk cannot be used against them in a court of law.'58 In other words, sus-
pects are informed that if they talk, what they say can be used against them, but are
1' See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
154 See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 78 F.3d 1190 (7th Cir. 1996); State v. Gaspard, 709
So. 2d 213, 218 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that defendant's statement that he was "ready
to go" was insufficient to invoke his right to remain silent).
155 See generally Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, supra note 146; Strauss, Silence, supra
note 2.
156 See State v. Dumas, 750 A.2d 420, 425 & n.5 (R.I. 2000) ("In normal parlance, this
syntactic phraseology is an acceptable and reasonable way to frame a request.... [A] customer
at a restaurant may ask the server, 'Can I get a cup of chowder?' An impatient shopper might
ask a sales clerk, 'Can I get some service over here?' In each case, it is clearly understood that
the speaker is making a request for a particular desired object or action.").
117 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966) (delineating requirements for substance
of "Miranda warnings").
's A suspect's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence can be used against a suspect. In Fletcher v.
Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982), the Court allowed a suspect's silence after his arrest to impeach
his trial claim of self-defense. But post-Miranda warning silence cannot be used against the
defendant (unless the defendant puts his silence into issue) because such silence may be nothing
more than the arrestee's exercise of his or her rights. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
See generally Strauss, Silence, supra note 2.
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never told that if they do not talk, that failure to cooperate cannot be used against
them. Thus, some individuals might be tentative in requesting their rights out of fear
that this assertion will actually harm them or be construed in an adverse manner. 59
The ambiguity does not reflect uncertainty or lack of desire; the suspect truly wants
to remain silent but fears the consequences of invoking that right. That fear causes the
suspect to employ tentative, uncertain language or state the invocation as a request
or a question. Thus, a suspect may say something like "I can't talk now if that's
ok," or "I'd like to go home now and come back later," out of a belief that such a
request is less likely to sound uncooperative or confrontational and hence, less likely
to engender the anger or retribution of the authorities.
The fear that asserting their rights may be used against them, moreover, may
become magnified when a suspect, after making a tentative attempt to remain silent,
is either ignored by the officer, or, perhaps worse, responded to by an officer trying
to convince her to talk. For example, when a suspect indicates in some imprecise
manner that she wants to remain silent, and the police officer says something like
"are you sure, this is your only chance to tell your side," or, "that might not look too
good for you, if you have something to say, you should say it now,"' 6 the belief that
staying silent will somehow "hurt" her is reinforced.
My point thus far is simple: of the three possible explanations for an ambiguous
statement described above, it is at least as reasonable, if not more reasonable, to be-
lieve that the ambiguity reflects a person's best attempt, given the circumstances, to
invoke the right to remain silent. The kind of requests that courts routinely treat as
ambiguous are a normal, rational way of invoking the right to remain silent given
the suspect's characteristics and the inherently intimidating custodial environment.
It is an inevitable type of phrasing when the invocation itself may be viewed as
costly or risky. In other words, it is highly likely that, for a variety of reasons, what
is deemed an ambiguous invocation is intended by the suspect as a clear assertion
of her rights.
But what if some of the ambiguity does reflect true uncertainty? For example,
a suspect who says, "maybe I should stay quiet, I don't know what to do," may truly
be experiencing conflicted emotions. Or what if there is really no way to know what
159 See, e.g., O'Neill, supra note 17, at 873 (discussing that one explanation for high
Miranda warning waivers is that silence seems like it will be used against them); Charles J.
Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1826, 1828 (1987) ("My clients and my colleagues' clients often report that,
notwithstanding the warnings, they believed either that their silence could be used against
them as evidence of guilt or, more frequently, that by remaining silent they would forfeit their
opportunity to be released on bail.").
'60 See, e.g., State v. Mares, No. 02-0847-CR, 2003 WL 1993005, at *6-7 (Wis. Ct. App.
May 1, 2003) (holding that when police told suspect who said he did not want to talk that "it
was in his best interest" to speak to them and that he would "feel better and get a weight off
his chest if he explained his side of the incident," these were invalid promptings after the
suspect invoked his right to remain silent).
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an ambiguous statement reflects? The question then becomes, what are the risks and
costs of assuming it is an assertion of the right versus the risks of assuming it is not.
2. The Cost Calculus: Treating an Ambiguous Assertion as Invoking the
Right to Remain Silent (or Right to Counsel) Would Not Thwart Effective
Law Enforcement
One of the concerns clearly animating the Davis majority was the desire not to
hamper law enforcement by foreclosing a valuable opportunity to question a sus-
pect.16' The Court in Davis, however, incorrectly calculated the costs that would
incur if an ambiguous invocation required clarification or even cessation of ques-
tions. A true "costs" analysis would reveal that the costs of stopping the interroga-
tion are minimal because the value of the interrogation must be discounted by the
concern over false confessions. In other words, confessions should be viewed with
skepticism rather than awe, especially when dealing with an unwilling or confused
suspect who believes that the police are not honoring her rights. Moreover, the
"cost" of stopping the interrogation is minimal because any suspect who is truly
willing to speak to the police can easily do so by initiating further conversation.
Finally, even if the suspect does not re-initiate contact, the police still can attempt
to re-interrogate a suspect who previously invoked his right to remain silent.'62 Each
of these arguments are discussed in turn.
First, the value of information obtained by interrogation must be considered with
at least with some skepticism. The core of the Miranda decision reflects a belief that
confessions, though a potentially important tool for law enforcement, should not be pur-
sued at all costs. Not all crimes are solved by confessions; physical evidence may ren-
der a statement by the suspect unnecessary. And when physical evidence is weak or
non-existent, reliance on a confession-particularly one obtained by ignoring a poten-
tial invocation by a vulnerable, non-sophisticated suspect-is wrought with problems. '63
The notion that confessions should be viewed with some skepticism has gar-
nered additional scientific support in the last forty years. Research has shown that
innocent people do falsely confess. And the advent of DNA testing has made clear
that innocent people are convicted on the basis of false confessions. In one study,
twenty-five percent of those exonerated by DNA evidence were convicted largely
on the basis of a confession. 6"
161 See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 473-74 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
162 See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 106 (1975) (citations omitted).
'63 "Confessions are less important where there is strong corroboration and much more
important where there is little, and it is in the latter case that the primary risk of false con-
fession exists." Duke, supra note 2, at 568 n.85.
164 John Wilkens, Untrue Confessions, SAN DIEGOUNION-TRIB., Apr. 15,2004, available
at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/2004041 5/newslz lc 1 confess.html; see Richard
J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational
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My claim, of course, is not that all confessions are false nor that confessions are
worthless or not worth pursuing. Clearly, interrogation remains an important part of
the law enforcement arsenal.165 Rather, my point is that the benefits of interrogation
should be put in the proper perspective. Not all interrogations successfully lead to
confessions, not all confessions are necessary to the solving of crimes, and not all
confessions are reliable. The incidence of false confessions is not insignificant, and
"[tihere is no greater injustice than the conviction of an innocent person."' More-
over, those persons most likely to falsely confess-those who are highly suggestible
or highly compliant, mentally handicapped, cognitively impaired, children, mentally
ill and those particularly vulnerable to the pressures of police interrogation67-are pre-
cisely the group least capable of directly and unambiguously asserting their rights.
Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979 (1997) (asserting that police tactics cause "normal" people to
falsely confess); Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against
Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105 (1997). And, of course, the
ones we know about are just the tip of the iceberg. Thomas H. Maugh II, Glendale Case
Raises Issue of Reliability of Confessions, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998, at Al. Part of the prob-
lem is that a confession is viewed by the jury as a virtually "irrefutable presumption of guilt."
See Richard Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions, in WRONGLY
CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 36, 45 (Saundra D. Westervelt & John A.
Humphrey eds., 2001); see also Sharon L. Davies, The Reality of False Confessions-Lessons
of the Central Park Jogger Case, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 209, 253 ("The Central
Park jogger case shows that once a jury is exposed to a confession of guilt it is difficult for
jurors to put it aside, even when it is uncorroborated or flatly contradicted by other evidence.").
And the police are notoriously poorjudges of whether a suspect's confession is reliable. Saul
Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices
and Beliefs, 31 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 381 (2007); Drake Bennett, The War in the Mind,
BOSTON GLOBE, available at Nov. 27,2005, http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/
2005/11/27/the war in the mind.
The advent of DNA testing and other scientific development may also render less pressing
the need for a suspect's confession. See Thomas, Miranda's Illusion, supra note 5, at 1116
(noting that "DNA testing can remove the vast majority of [innocent] suspects from the system
sooner rather than later" and will only be more useful over time as tests become more sophis-
ticated (footnote omitted)). The growth in scientific technology may render it less essential for
law enforcement agencies to center an investigation on information "cajoled" from a suspect,
especially in the most serious of crimes like murder and rape.
'65 The concern that law enforcement will be hampered by imposing a "clarification" rule
is one of the main justifications for the Davis rule and its application to the right to remain
silent. See State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 719 (Fla. 1997) ("To require the police to clarify
whether an equivocal statement is an assertion of one's Miranda rights places too great an
impediment upon society's interest in thwarting crime.").
'66 Boaz Sangero, Miranda Is Not Enough: A New Justification for Demanding "Strong
Corroboration" to a Confession, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2791, 2792 (2007).
167 Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back in: False Confessions and Legal
Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 479, 517-18; see also Dale E.
Ives, Preventing False Confessions: Is Oickle up to the Task?, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 477,
481-83 (2007).
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Thus, the risk that suspects who ambiguously assert their rights but are ignored by
police will falsely confess may well be greater than that of the average suspect.
Second, even if confessions are deemed a reliable and valuable law enforcement
tactic, treating ambiguous assertions as invocation of rights does not necessarily pre-
clude police questioning. My argument here is simple: a suspect who truly wishes to
talk to the police-who did not want to invoke his rights when he has made an ambig-
uous comment-can talk to the police even if his request is treated as an invocation
of rights. That is, any suspect who wants to tell his story can affirmatively initiate
conversation with police at any time and waive his rights.' Thus, if a suspect who
said, "I don't want to talk now," meant only to ask for a momentary pause in the
conversation, he can, after what he decides is a sufficient passage of time, say to the
officers, "Ok, I'm ready to talk," and the interrogation can proceed. The only differ-
ence between this scenario and the one allowed by Davis is that the suspect controls
the interrogation process-precisely the result anticipated in Miranda.'69
Finally, and most significantly, even if a suspect does not initiate further contact
with the police, the police can attempt to re-question the suspect. Under Mosley, an
invocation of the right to remain silent does not preclude later police-initiated inter-
rogation--even potentially only two hours later, according to Mosley itself.170 Mosley
requires only that the suspect's rights be "scrupulously honored.' 17' Although the
168 The facts of the case inBui v. DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232 (1st Cir. 1999), aptly demonstrate
this. The suspect, a Vietnamese immigrant was read his rights. Id. at 238. The police officer
asked him if he had anything to say about his arrest. The suspect said no. Id. He then added,
"Who said I did this?" Id. At this point interrogation continued. Id. The court held that "no"
was ambiguous, in part due to his continued talking. Id. at 241. Instead of using subsequent
comments to cast doubt on the clarity of his invocation in order to conclude that the petitioner
did not unequivocally assert his right, (or reading the entire event as a waiver of rights), the
"no" should have been deemed an invocation of the right to remain silent, but the question
which immediately followed it should be deemed an initiation by the suspect which allows
for a waiver and subsequent interrogation. The police could talk to the suspect under all ap-
proaches described above, but analyzing it under the initiation doctrine avoids setting a prece-
dent that "no" does not mean "no," or that subsequent statements can render an invocation
ambiguous. The point is, the ability of the police to interrogate a willing suspect is not ham-
pered even if the "no" were viewed as unambiguous. It only prevents talking to those suspects
who really do not want to talk and whose free will is thus subverted by the police. See also
State v. Aleksey, 538 S.E.2d 248, 254 (S.C. 2000) (holding that the statement, "That's all I've
got to say," was ambiguous because it could simply be the end of the story; even if it wasn't,
the suspect shortly thereafter initiated a conversation by asking about the status of some people
involved in the crime, and thus further interrogation was permissible), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
1027 (2001); Davis v. State, No. 06-05-00222-CR, 2007 WL 858782, at *3 (Tex. App. Mar. 23,
2007) (holding that a suspect who said, "I really don't want to talk about it," and then followed
it up with "I mean, I ain't the one who did it," did not unambiguously invoke his rights and
even if he did, his latter statement reinitiated interrogation).
169 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-69 (1966).
170 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104-05 (1975).
1'1 See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text; see also Commonwealth v. Brant, 395
N.E.2d 1320 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that a fourteen-minute period between questioning
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Supreme Court noted six factors to consider in determining whether a suspect's
rights were scrupulously honored, most courts only require three: that the original
interrogation immediately cease, that there be a significant passage of time, and that
the suspect be afforded a fresh set of Miranda warnings. 17 2 Clearly none of these pose
onerous obstacles to a resumption of police-initiated questioning.
was not insignificant given that the defendant had initiated the resumption of questioning),
rev'd, 406 N.E.2d 1021 (Mass. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980). But see Common-
wealth v. Taylor, 374 N.E.2d 81, 85-86 (Mass. 1978) (holding that a five-minute interval
between questioning concerning the same crime was not sufficient).
172 See State v. Mares, No. 02-0847-CR, 2003 WL 1993005, at *6 (Wis. Ct. App. May 1,
2003) ("[T]he presence or absence of the Mosley... factors is not controlling and the factors
do not establish a test that can be 'woodenly' applied . . . ."). What is imperative under
Mosley is that the defendant receive the message that "all he needs to do to foreclose or halt
questioning is to give a negative response when asked if he will submit thereto .... [T]o
communicate this message ... the interrogation [must] stop for some period of time."
Latimer v. State, 433 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981); see State v. Culp, Nos.
IK98-08-0027, IK98-08-0028, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 369, at *6 n. 14 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug.
2, 1999) (holding that the standard that "police may later resume questioning after the
passage of a significant period of time and after the accused has [received new warnings]"
was not met here because not enough time passed-only a bathroom break-and there was
no re-issuance of warnings); People v. Nielson, 718 N.E.2d 131,142-43 (111. 1999) (holding
that a defendant's right to remain silent was scrupulously honored when the first interview
halted immediately after the suspect invoked his right to remain silent, there was about two-
and-a-half hours between interviews, and the suspect received new Miranda warnings; the
fact that the questions concerned the same crime was not determinative). But see State v.
Rossignol, 627 A.2d 524, 527 (Me. 1993) (requiring that subsequent questions be about a
different topic); cf. Freeman v. State, 857 A.2d 557 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (honoring
scrupulously rights when there was a reasonable time lapse- three hours-and a different
interrogator, although it was the same locale and same topic); State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d
83, 88-89 (Mo. 1998) (holding Mosley was met by the passage of five days even though the
interrogation was about the same crime), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1082 (1999).
The most lenient application of Mosley that I discovered was that undertaken by a court
of appeals in Michigan. See People v. Jackson, No. 269071, 2007 WL 1864946 (Mich. Ct.
App. June 28, 2007) (per curiam). A suspect had expressed some confusion about his rights,
and the police had clarified and explained them. Id. at *3. The court held that even if the sus-
pect's comments constituted an unequivocal assertion of the right to remain silent, that right
was scrupulously honored by the clarification questions. Id. Although there was no meaningful
passage of time, and the questioning was by the same officers in the same location on the same
topic, the court held:
Although courts have enumerated relevant considerations in determining
whether questioning after an assertion of the right to remain silent is
proper, the "scrupulously honored" standard does not require that any
mandatory criteria be satisfied .... "[T]he ultimate inquiry is whether
the police have 'scrupulously honored' a defendant's assertion of the
(right to cut off questioning.)"
Here, the detectives' questions merely sought to make sure that
defendant truly understood what the assertion of the right to silence
entailed given that defendant had just waived his right to counsel and
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Concededly, the cost of invoking the right to counsel under Davis and Edwards
appears greater: interrogation must cease and police-initiated interrogation is not
possible. 173 Even under Edwards, however, re-interrogation is possible, albeit on the
suspect's terms.174 That is, a suspect who desires to tell her story can initiate a con-
versation with the police (and waive her rights) or talk to them with a lawyer pres-
ent. Given the fairly broad reading of initiation, moreover, this possibility is not an
obscure one.'75 Of course, even without initiation by the suspect, the police can
had asked a question about his right to remain silent.... [WIhen the
detectives' comments are placed in their proper context, they cannot be
reasonably construed as an attempt to "wear down defendant's resis-
tance".., or even as an attempt to "communicate to the defendant that
the detectives would not honor his assertion of the privilege." Rather,
[they] "just wanted to be sure whether or not defendant wanted to talk to
them".... Thus, it cannot be said that the detectives did not "scrupu-
lously honor" defendant's assertion of his "right to cut off questioning."
Id. (citations omitted). But see Ramos v. State, 245 S.W.3d 410,419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(holding that Mosley is not satisfied when police attempted to re-question a suspect only five
minutes after he invoked his rights). One court permitted an eight-minute gap between invo-
cation and re-interrogation on the same topic under Mosley, but the court conflated the Mosley
test with initiation: "While only a short period of time passed after Appellant invoked his
right to remain silent, it was Appellant and not the officers who initiated the conversation."
Urias v. State, No. 08-01-00355-CR, 2006 WL 2516361, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2006).
173 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
484-85 (1981).
174 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484.
115 See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). The precise definition of initiation is
unclear. The plurality in Bradshaw stated that initiation occurs when the suspect makes state-
ments or inquiries evincing a desire for a "more generalized discussion relating directly or indi-
rectly to the investigation" as opposed to inquiries or statements relating to routine incidents
of the custodial relationship. Id. at 1045 (plurality opinion). The plurality held that initiation in
that case occurred when the suspect asked, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" while
being driven back to jail. Id. at 1040. Many criticize the Court's conclusion that this comment
constituted initiation even under the Court's own test. See, e.g., LAFAVE Er AL., supra note 62,
§ 6.9, at 849. Although the four-Justice plurality test is the one employed by most lower courts,
at least one court suggested that it was free to choose the test set forth by the four-person dissent
in Bradshaw. See State v. Hambly, 745 N.W.2d 48 (Wis. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 177
(2008). The dissent in Bradshaw suggested a more stringent test: that initiation occurs when
the suspect starts a dialogue specifically and directly focused on the investigation. Id. at 67
(citing Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1053 (Marshall, J., dissenting)). The Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that under either test, the defendant initiated conversation when the suspect told the detec-
tive that he did not understand why he was under arrest. Id. at 69-70; see also Commonwealth
v. LeClair, 770 N.E.2d 50, 56 & n. 11 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (discussing Bradshaw plurality
and dissent). But see State v. Chew, 695 A.2d 1301, 1318 (N.J. 1997) (acknowledging that there
are separate tests set forth by the plurality and the dissent and that it had not yet chosen between
the two, but deciding that the court "perceive[d] little difference between the tests.. ."), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1052 (1999). For various applications of the rule, see United States v.
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approach a suspect to try to obtain a waiver of rights when the suspect has his
lawyer present. 1
76
3. Treating an Ambiguous Invocation as Irrelevant Has Great Cost to the
Individual's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Against this diminished value of confessions and the recognition that re-interroga-
tion can occur with a willing defendant must be weighed the harm to an individual's
free choice that the Davis rule entails. While the Davis Court overestimated the cost
to law enforcement if ambiguous invocations were treated as invocations (or required
to be clarified), they underestimated (or ignored) the significant costs to the objectives
of Miranda---ensuring a free and voluntary choice to submit to police interrogation.1 77
Ignoring an ambiguous request for counsel or to remain silent and permitting further
interrogation almost certainly interferes with an individual's determination whether
to ever invoke his or her rights. 17 Assume, for a minute, that an ambiguous request
reflects a suspect's cultural background or intimidation in the circumstance or fear of
reprisal, as suggested earlier. Thus, the suspect who says, "well, I think I might like
to stay silent," is trying politely, albeit hesitantly, to invoke the right to remain silent.
Or take the suspect who says, "I don't want to talk now." If the police ignore such
Thongsophaporn, 503 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that a defendant's question of
police agent who had been sitting silently for a bit over five minutes, "what was going on[?]"
constituted an initiation), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1294 (2008); Vann v. Small, No. 99-55-84,
1999 WL 439400, at *1-2 (9th Cir. June 18, 1999) (holding that Vann initiated further con-
versation with police in a patrol car by asking, "What is going to happen to me? What do you
think I should do?"), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1088 (2000); United States v. Debrew, No. 93-5766,
1994 WL 637245, at *2 (4th Cir. Nov. 14, 1994) (holding that the statement, "Look man, I'll
tell you about it," reinitiated conversation); Robbins v. Maass, No. 91-35726, 1992 WL
170952, at *1-2 (9th Cir. July 22, 1992) (holding that a suspect's comment, "Exactly what
is the charge here?"initiated conversation); State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1246-47 (La.
2008) (holding that after invoking right to counsel, suspect initiated by saying, "No, come here,
come here," even though that followed the police officer's comments: "Dude, you don't want
to talk to us no more, you want a lawyer, right? I trusted you and you let me down"); LeClair,
770 N.E.2d at 56 (holding that defendant's statement that "he was in a lot of trouble" and his
inquiry into "whether he needed counsel, evinced a desire for more generalized conversation
at least sufficient to permit further inquiry about whether the defendant continued to stand by
his earlier invocation of his right to counsel"); and Henderson v. Commonwealth, No. 0653-
05-4, 2006 WL 1459974, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. May 30, 2006) (holding that a suspect initiated
by saying, after the detective started to leave, "[M]aybe I'll make the letter of apology").
176 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.
177 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) ("Our aim is to assure that the
individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the
interrogation process.").
178 See People v. Jones, No. 273193,2007 WL 292532, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2007)
(seeing that his requests for a lawyer were futile because the police simply continued speaking
to him, defendant elected to speak to the police without a lawyer and confessed to the crime).
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a request and continue questioning, the suspect likely would never bother to invoke
again, even if that remains a continuing or ever-growing desire as the interrogation
continues. After all, his initial attempt to invoke his rights was met with disdain, re-
inforcing all his fears and concerns in the first place. The belief that such a person
would then be capable of unequivocally and clearly invoking their rights at some
point in the interrogation seems naive at best.
And what about a person who truly is uncertain about what they want? Again,
the officers' response likely reinforces any hesitancy against invocation. After all,
the police can ignore the invocation, but they can also emphasize the desirability of
talking to them without an attorney. In other words, because they do not have to cease
interrogation immediately, they can attempt to subtly-or not so subtly-dissuade the
person from asserting the right to remain silent or from seeking counsel. For example,
if in response to a suspect's comment, "I think I should see a lawyer," the police offi-
cer says, "Well, then you won't be able to tell us your side and we'll be left wondering
what you have to hide," or says, "Only the guilty get a lawyer," or simply continues
the interrogation, the likelihood that the suspect will believe that they truly have a
free choice in the future to invoke their right to counsel is greatly diminished.
Similarly, if in response to a suspect's comment, "I probably shouldn't talk," the
police simply continue questioning, or express incredulity that the suspect would not
want to help himself by giving his side of the story, the chance that a suspect will
attempt to assert his right to remain silent in the future is remote. After all, the
suspect does not say to himself, "Oh yes, I must say it more clearly, that's why they
ignored me. Next time I'll say, 'I am invoking my right to remain silent' and all will
be well." Rather, the police officer's response reinforces those feelings of hopeless-
ness and intimidation that caused the ambiguous request in the first place. In other
words, police officers can subtly, or even overtly, convince a suspect to continue
talking after an ambiguous invocation. And in so doing, of course, police will
reinforce the suspect's common fear discussed earlier, that if he invokes his rights,
it will in some way harm him.
4. Conclusion
Davis was wrongly decided and should be overturned. First, in too many cases,
ambiguous comments about the right to remain silent or the right to counsel will
represent an attempt to invoke the rights rather than true ambivalence or uncertainty.
For these people, then, the goal of Miranda-giving individuals the tools to counter
inherently coercive pressure by asserting their right not to deal with the police alone
or at all-is thwarted. Moreover, it is subverted for no good reason. Police investiga-
tions will not be unduly hampered. The importance of police interrogation may well
be overstated and, most significantly, individuals who want to talk to the police can
still do so by initiating conversation (and waiving their rights). Even if no initiation
occurs, at least when the right to remain silent is invoked the police can simply attempt
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to re-question later. Further, even if the number of confessions is diminished, that
price may not be so costly. Physical evidence may be available to convict the suspect,
and the reliability of confessions, particularly in the absence of substantial physical
evidence, should be of some concern. Finally, even if a suspect was truly uncertain
when voicing a potential request for counsel or to remain silent, if the police simply
ignore it, or use the opportunity to convince the suspect that invoking his rights would
be detrimental, the likelihood of a suspect subsequently invoking his rights and cur-
tailing the interrogation is drastically diminished. That suspect would likely feel he
has no real choice at any stage in the interrogation process but to continue talking. For
all these reasons, the conclusion that the right to counsel and the right to remain silent
must be unambiguously asserted is in error.
B. Davis Should Not Be Applied to the Right to Remain Silent
Even if Davis was correctly decided, it applied by its terms only to the right to
counsel and it should not be expanded to encompass the right to remain silent. I reach
this conclusion for two reasons. First, as a matter of law, the two rights need not be
treated alike. Second, as a matter of policy, the rule in Davis should not apply to the
right to remain silent.
1. As a Matter of Law
In some ways, it is ironic that courts would, without explanation, import the Davis
rule concerning the right to counsel to the right to remain silent because in virtually
every other aspect of the rules, the courts go out of their way to develop distinct stan-
dards. 17 9 Most obvious, of course, are the divergent rules that govern re-interrogation
after invocation of the respective rights. Police can re-question suspects after an invo-
cation of the right to remain silent so long as the suspects' rights are scrupulously
honored; re-questioning after the invocation of the right to counsel requires that the
suspects initiate the conversation and waive their rights. 80 Given that in this most
basic and fundamental way, the rights are not treated the same, it is not clear why
courts, with no real explanation, determine that the Davis rule applies to invocations
of the right to remain silent.
179 See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 150 (1990) (holding that the opportunity to
consult with an attorney does not change Edwards; emphasizing, unlike Mosley, the need for
a bright-line, clear rule); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 (1988) (questioning of a
suspect by law enforcement about a different offense does not alter Edwards rule). See
generally Wayne D. Holly, Ambiguous Invocations of the Right to Remain Silent: A Post-
Davis Analysis and Proposal, 29 SETON HALLL. REv. 558 (1998) (discussing the distinction
between the right to counsel and the right to remain silent).
'go See supra notes 24-43 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the right to remain silent is the transcendent right protected by
Miranda.8 ' The right to counsel exists only to protect the right to remain silent-the
right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. After all, a suspect does not
really have a right to an attorney under Miranda; Miranda is not violated if the
suspect is never provided an attorney so long as no interrogation occurs in the
absence of such an appointment. 18' Thus, even if the Court decides that a suspect
must invoke the right to counsel in a particular manner, there is no inherent reason
why the right to remain silent needs to be asserted in precisely the same way. To a
large extent, the Court in Davis recognized this distinction between the transcendent
constitutional right in Miranda-the right to remain silent-and the right to counsel,
which is there to protect the right not to self-incriminate. As the Court in Davis
held, "[W]e are unwilling to create a third layer of prophylaxis to prevent police
questioning when the suspect might want a lawyer. Unless the suspect actually
requests an attorney, questioning may continue. 183
Finally, the Miranda decision itself suggests that an ambiguous invocation is suf-
ficient to invoke the right to remain silent. When discussing the right to remain silent,
the Court suggested that "[i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior
to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent... the interrogation must
cease. ' '""4 It is difficult to imagine the meaning of "in any manner" if not to include
ambiguous invocations.1 85 Thus, at a minimum, the Miranda decision itself suggests
181 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439 (concerning the necessity for procedures to ensure an
individual is "accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to
be compelled to incriminate himself'). Thomas, Miranda's Illusion, supra note 5, at 1094-95
("Reading Miranda now, 36 years after it was written, one is struck by the Court's genu-
flection in the direction of suspect 'free choice'-a locution that, in one variation or another,
appears at least nine times in the majority opinion."). But see State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d
277, 284-85 (Minn. 1995) (using Edwards and the greater procedural protections afforded
when a suspect invokes the right to counsel as proof that the right to counsel is of pre-eminent
concern); State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715,718 n.6 (Fla. 1997) ("If anything, requests for counsel
have been accorded greater judicial deference than requests to terminate interrogation."). Inter-
estingly, studies show that suspects are slightly more likely to invoke the right to counsel than
the right to silence. Welsh S. White, Deflecting a Suspect from Requesting an Attorney, 68
U. Prrr. L. REv. 29, 36 (2006).
182 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
183 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994).
184 Id. at 471-72 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). There is no similar language in that paragraph about the right to counsel. Instead
the Court stated simply, "If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation
must cease until an attorney is present." Id. at 474. Whether this divergence is intentional or
inadvertent is not clear. Other places in the opinion, however, use similar language with respect
to the right to counsel. Id. at 444-45.
185 See, e.g., Matthew W. D. Bowman, Note, The Right to Counsel During Custodial
Interrogation: Equivocal References to an Attorney-Determining What Statements or Conduct
Should Constitute an Accused's Invocation of the Right to Counsel, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1159,
1187 (1986).
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some leeway should be accorded a suspect who might want to stay silent in the face
of police questioning.
2. As a Matter of Policy
Most of the policy justifications for not employing the Davis rule with respect to
the right to remain silent were discussed above.'" Most significant, the fact that police
questioning can easily resume after an invocation of silence is made, unlike a request
for counsel, strongly suggests that a different rule for asserting the right to remain
silent is in order. In other words, even if Davis was a viable decision with respect to
the right to counsel because the ramification of such an invocation is so severe, that
same concern does not exist with respect to the right to remain silent. Given the rela-
tive ease with which new questioning can occur, there is no corresponding need for
a stringent rule governing assertion of the right to remain silent.187
Indeed, given the rules governing the right to remain silent and re-questioning,
there is a strong argument that a stringent rule is not only unnecessary, it is wholly in-
appropriate. In some ways, the combination of Davis and Mosley stacks the deck for
the state. If a suspect ambiguously invokes the right to remain silent, the police can
ignore such comments and continue questioning. In the remote chance that the suspect
makes an unambiguous invocation, the police can re-question later under the fairly
undemanding standards of Mosley. Hence, the application of Davis, in conjunction
with other rules regarding the right to remain silent, has an undesirable synergistic
effect.188 The police are, in many ways, placed in a win-win situation. If Davis is
186 See supra Part IlI.A.
187 See Holly, supra note 179, at 573 ("The perceived obstacle to police interrogations
imposed by Edwards simply does not exist in the same degree under Mosley and the right-to-
silence context."); see also Pefia v. State, 98 P.3d 857,868 (Wyo. 2004) (acknowledging that
the difference between Edwards and Mosley raised a significant question of whether Davis
should apply to the right to remain silent, but declining to resolve the issue since police here
properly clarified the ambiguous invocation).
188 This argument, moreover, can be expanded to include Court decisions elaborating upon
other aspects of the Miranda decision which many criticize as unfairly pro-police. For example,
some contend that the definition of custody has come to favor the police. Craig M. Bradley
& Joseph L. Hoffmann, "Be Careful What You Ask for": The 2000 Presidential Election, the
U.S. Supreme Court, and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 76 IND. L.J. 889,912 (2001); John
Douard, Note, The Intrinsically Coercive Nature of Police Interrogation, 3 RUTGERS RACE
& L. REv. 297, 307 (2001). Others argue that the Court's definition of "interrogation" is too
narrow. See, e.g., Lisa Lewis, Rethinking Miranda: Truth, Lies and Videotape, 43 GONZ. L.
REV. 199, 211 (2007); Jennifer Diana, Note, Apples and Oranges and Olives? Oh My! Fellers,
the Sixth Amendment, and the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 985,
996 (2005). Additionally, the police can ask questions-and the answers are admissible even
without the provision of Miranda warnings-if the questions were reasonably prompted by
a concern for public safety. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); see also Thomas,
Stories About Miranda, supra note 151, at 1996-97 (discussing how Quarles is used by the
police to admit confessions obtained without the issuance of warnings). The police can question
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justified at all, it has to be as the "price" of Edwards'89-that because invoking the
fight to counsel has such dire consequences for law enforcement, it should not be easy
to invoke. That argument cannot be made with respect to the right to remain silent.
Davis plus Mosley eviscerates the protections of Miranda.
C. Davis at Best Should Be Deemed a Limited Rule, Applicable Only to Post-
Waiver Invocations
Even if Davis is a viable decision, and even if it should apply to the right to
remain silent, it is in reality limited in its application. Davis is a rule governing post-
waiver initiations. That is, it applies only in the situation when the suspect already
has waived his or her rights.' 90
That Davis is a post-waiver case is clear from the facts of the case and from the
holding. Davis had previously waived his rights and agreed to talk without an attorney
present. At some point in the interrogation, he indirectly and ambiguously requested
an attorney. Justice O'Connor, in writing for the majority held that after a suspect
knowingly and voluntarily waives his Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may
continue questioning unless he or she clearly and unequivocally requests counsel. 9'
Despite the fact that Davis involved a post-waiver attempt at invocation, the lower
courts have not consistently limited it to that setting. Several lower courts have recog-
nized that Davis is limited to a post-waiver situation, 192 while others have applied it
more generally to any attempted invocation. 93 It is difficult to see, however, how the
Davis rule can truly apply pre-waiver. Take, for example, this exchange:
without providing Miranda warnings and any physical evidence derived from that interrogation
is admissible. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004). Finally, the Supreme Court has
recently shown some leeway for questioning outside Miranda. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S.
600 (2004).
i89 It is almost reminiscent of the "unintended consequences" argument in foreign policy.
It is hard to imagine that the Justices, when handing down a decision that was protective of a
suspect's rights in Edwards, imagined that the decision would lead to the result in Davis, and,
as a result, that it would be extremely difficult for a suspect to even invoke the right to counsel.
190 See Harvey Gee, Essay: When Do You Have To Be Clear?: Reconsidering Davis v.
United States, 30 Sw. U. L. REv. 381, 384 (2001) (arguing Davis only applies to post-waiver
situations); see, e.g., State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D. 2002) ('The Davis holding
obviously applies to instances where suspects attempt to invoke Miranda rights after a knowing
and voluntary waiver of those rights. Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal post-waiver invo-
cation of rights."); State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738 (Utah 1997).
'9' Davis, 512 U.S. 452, 459-61 (1994).
192 See, e.g., Dooley v. State, 743 So. 2d 65,69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) ("[T]he holding
in Owen [and Davis] 'applies only where the suspect has waived the right earlier during the
session."').
193 See, e.g., Bui v. DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232 (1st Cir. 1999) (applying Davis to a purported
assertion immediately after being read rights), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1086 (2000); State v. Law,
39 P.3d 661 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) (applying Davis rule to pre-waiver possible invocation);
Commonwealth v. Sicari, 752 N.E.2d 684, 697 n.13 (Mass. 2001) ("[C]ourts have held that
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Police provide a standard Miranda warning, suspect agrees to waive his rights,
and the police engage in questioning. At some point, the suspect responds as follows:
"Gee, I think I shouldn't say anything... You know .... my lawyer, he wouldn't
want me to talk to you ......
Because this would almost certainly be deemed ambiguous, the police can ignore
it and continue their line of questioning as if the suspect had said, "Gee, I think the
Dodgers will win the World Series." They already have a waiver.
But pre-waiver, the scenario is entirely different. Consider the following scenario.
A police officer provides a standard Miranda warning, and the suspect responds:
"Gee, I think I shouldn't say anything .... You know, my lawyer, he wouldn't want
me to talk to you."
Even if ambiguous, the police officer at this junction cannot simply "continue
questioning." There has been no waiver of rights. In other words, even if the equiv-
ocal statement is not deemed an invocation, it cannot be construed to constitute a
waiver. And a waiver of rights does not occur simply by the fact that the suspect pro-
ceeded to answer questions. 94 Thus, it is virtually inevitable that at least some clari-
fication of rights must occur in this context, if only to obtain a valid waiver.
My point is this: even if Davis renders an ambiguous statement insufficient to
invoke a suspect's rights, that statement should influence whether there occurred a
valid waiver. Pre-waiver, the statement should not be deemed the equivalent to "Gee,
I think the Dodgers might win the World Series." Even if not deemed an invocation
per se, the statement can and should be considered in deciding the validity of any
waiver. Pre-waiver, ignoring such a statement (or making a derogatory statement
about how not talking would hurt the defendant's cause) should render any subsequent
waiver invalid.'95 At a minimum, the officers need to clarify the suspect's desire in
order to satisfy the waiver requirements.
Thus, even if a court were inclined to adapt the Davis rule to the right to remain
silent, it should apply that rule at most to the post-waiver scenario. That was the
approach of the Maryland Court of Appeals in 2004:
unless a suspect 'clearly and unambiguously' invokes his right to remain silent, either before
or after a waiver of that right, the police are not required to cease questioning." (emphasis
added)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1142 (2002); State v. Moss, No. A-05-1132,2007 WL 91649,
at *5 (Neb. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2007) (applying Davis pre-waiver); cf. In Re Christopher K.,
841 N.E.2d 945,964-65 (11. 2005) ("Respondent correctly points out that the holding in Davis
is limited to the situation where the alleged invocation of the right to counsel comes after a
knowing and voluntary waiver.... By implication, this suggests the United States Supreme
Court has left open the issue of whether the objective test applies in a pre-waiver setting. We
believe the objective test set forth in Davis can be applied [pre-waiver.]").
194 See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (per curiam) (stating that the issues of
"[i]nvocation and waiver are entirely distinct inquiries, and the two must not be blurred by
merging them together").
'9' See State v. Collins, 937 So. 2d 86, 89, 93 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005), cert. denied, 549
U.S. 941 (2006).
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[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court's
bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right
to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had pre-
viously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, argu-
ably sought to exercise his rights. Based on the foregoing, we
decline to apply the rationale of Davis to our analysis of appellant's
silence, because the silence occurred in a pre-waiver context.'
96
CONCLUSION: SOME POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
In recent years, a plethora of suggestions for improving Miranda, including
limiting the length of an interrogation,' 97 curtailing the "trickery" police officers can
employ,198 and, perhaps most significantly, requiring videotaping of confessions' 99
have been suggested. While these are certainly laudable, this Article urges a re-
examination and re-invigoration of Miranda's central premise: that suspects have
a basic right not to answer questions by the police. 20 To preserve that core value of
Miranda, suspects should not be required to assert their rights unambiguously before
police need honor those rights.
This Article suggested reasons to believe that suspects in the inherently intimidat-
ing environment of a custodial interrogation are likely to assert their rights indirectly
and tentatively, and provided case after case in which the courts held that such ambig-
uous assertions were insufficient to constitute any invocation of rights. This case law
undoubtedly speaks to people in different ways. Some of the statements that courts
held to be ambiguous frankly shocked me. Others might be more inclined to provide
the police with the benefit of the doubt, and suggest that they are in the best position
to evaluate ambiguity. It is difficult for me to prove that when a suspect said, "I don't
want to talk about it," or "I got nothing to say," or "I don't want to talk now," or "I
guess I shouldn't talk," that the suspect was attempting, to the best of their ability,
to end the interrogation.
Thus, perhaps the strongest evidence for the need for change comes not from the
cases directly but from some remarkable statistics. Of all suspects subjected to
196 Freeman v. State, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004); accord State v. Hill,
No. 55071-3-I, 2006 WL 3056408, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2006).
17 Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against
Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105 (1997).
98 Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 581 (1979).
But see Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far Is Too Far, 99
MICH. L. REv. 1168 (2001).
'9 See Erik Lilliquist, Improving Accuracy in Criminal Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV 897,
923-26 (2007) (advocating taping despite recognizing some problems with it); Slobogin,
supra note 5.
200 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472 (1966).
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custodial interrogation, only one in five refuse to talk initially.2°' That is, eighty per-
cent waive their rights; only twenty percent refuse to speak or refuse to speak without
an attorney present. As I noted before, a good proportion of these twenty percent
who refuse to talk are persons with prior felonies. 20 2 Whether they have learned that
talking to the police is not helpful, or learned how to effectively invoke their rights
(unlike novices to the criminal justice system) is unknowable-and probably a combi-
nation of both! But the more troubling statistic is this: out of those eighty percent
who do agree to talk, virtually none subsequently assert their rights during the inter-
rogation.20 3 In other words, studies show that almost no suspect who waives his rights
initially and is subjected to police questioning later effectively invokes his rights.
Almost none of the suspects do what Miranda so carefully guaranteed them--control
whether and when they speak to the police.
Why do I call this remarkable? Of course, it is possible that all those who decide
to speak to the police find the experience so helpful, cathartic, and enjoyable that they
never want it to end. Frankly, I find this possibility preposterous. Rather, I believe
that the only logical explanation for this statistic is that the rules for asserting either
the right to counsel or the right to remain silent have become so difficult that almost
no one is able to do it. Empirically, this seems evident by the fact that the number
who manage to assert their rights post-waiver is infinitesimal. Descriptively, I hope
I showed through my examination of the specific cases how the courts have set the
bar for an unambiguous invocation incredibly and unrealistically high.2 °4
201 Saul M. Kassin et al., supra note 164, at 383 ("Consistently, research has revealed that
custodial suspects waive their rights approximately eighty percent of the time."). "Next to
the warning label on cigarette packs, Miranda is the most widely ignored piece of official
advice in our society." Patrick A. Malone, "You Have the Right to Remain Silent": Miranda
After Twenty Years, 55 AM. SCHOLAR, Spring 1986, at 367,368. One scholar wrote that the
Miranda Court "would have been stunned" had they seen the data on how few people resist
police interrogation. Thomas, Stories About Miranda, supra note 151, at 1977 (2004).
202 See Duke, supra note 2.
203 William J. Stuntz, Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REv. 975, 977 (2001) ("[O]nce
suspects agree to talk to police, they almost never call a halt to questioning or invoke their
right to have the assistance of counsel."); see also Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda
Revisited, 86 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621,653 tbl.1 (1996) (noting that of 182 Miranda
suspects, thirty-eight invoked their Miranda rights but only two did so after an initial
waiver); Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519,
1554-55 (1967).
204 In a study of 211 cases in which the suspects were provided their Miranda rights, sus-
pects invoked their right to counsel in twenty cases and invoked the right to remain silent in
six. Thomas, Stories About Miranda, supra note 151, at 1972-73 tbls.2 & 3. In eleven of the
twenty cases where the suspect invoked the right to counsel, statements were suppressed or
no questioning occurred at all. Id. In all of the six cases where the suspects claimed to have
invoked the right to remain silent, the claim was rejected and the incriminating statement was
admissible. Id.
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So what should be done? Many others have discussed possible solutions in great
detail,2 5 and, thus, I will only sketch out three proposals here. First, ideally, all am-
biguous invocations of the right to remain silent should end the interrogation and
further interrogation should proceed under the rules of Mosley.2°6 Such an approach
would best protect the suspect's free will, given my arguments that many (if not most)
ambiguous invocations likely represent attempts to remain silent. And, given the ease
with which re-interrogation can occur under Mosley, this approach would pose no
real impediment to law enforcement interests. This solution, however, is unlikely to
be embraced. It was clearly rejected by the Supreme Court in Davis, and had been a
minority position in the court pre-Davis, at least with respect to the right to counsel.'
Alternatively, the courts should adopt a stringent "stop-and-clarify" method. By
stringent, I mean that the method would have to follow specific and rigid rules similar
to Miranda warnings so as to ensure that the suspect's will is not worn down. For
example, a police officer should be required to have a set script and would not be able
to use the opportunity to editorialize on the benefits of talking to the police. Such
a script might go like this:
It sounds like you don't want to speak to us about any topic, but
it wasn't clear. You have the right not to speak to us, and we are
prepared to honor that right. And if you don't want to speak to
us, there will be no adverse consequence to you. So, do you want
to speak to us at this time?
Let me add one other suggestion that would help ensure that the ideals of Miranda
with respect to the right to remain silent be realized. The initial warnings should in-
clude the following two additions: First, the police must say: "You have the right to
remain silent and you may state at any time that you don't wish to talk to us during
the interrogation and we will stop asking you questions. In other words, if you decide
to talk now, you can stop at any time." Second, the suspect must be told: "If you de-
cide to ask for an attorney or to stay quiet, that choice will not be used against you in
any way. We cannot comment on the fact that you chose not to talk to us in court.,,20 8
The first statement would explicitly inform the suspect that they can assert the right
at any time-a right only implicitly conveyed currently. The second statement would
hopefully dispel the fear of a suspect that the invocation of silence would "make them
look bad" and could be used against them.
205 See, e.g., Holly, supra note 179, at 581.
206 See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
207 See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
208 This suggestion is explored in an excellent law review article, Mark A. Godsey,
Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary Law and Understandings,
90 MINN. L. REv. 781 (2006).
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After forty odd years, Miranda has been probed and prodded, attacked from all
sides and, most recently, reaffirmed by the Court.2 9 At its heart lies the right of each
individual to decide freely whether to cooperate with the police by submitting to ques-
tioning."' The Miranda decision represents the viewpoint that the suspect's choice
to remain silent, or to speak only with the help of counsel, is not an evil to be avoided
but an acceptable option. Somehow, this perspective has become thwarted by judges
intent on promoting police interrogations at almost any cost. It is time to restore the
promise of Miranda at its most basic level-to truly protect the right to remain silent.
That right should not only be the province of those fortunate enough or educated
enough to say the right words. The promise belongs to all.
209 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
21' Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (holding that the right against self-
incrimination "is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will' (citation omitted)).
[Vol. 17:773824
APPENDIX
STATE CASES CONSIDERING WHETHER DAVIS APPLIED TO
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AS OF FEBRUARY, 2008
Alabama-uses clarification approach but has not discussed the possible application
of Davis. Freeman v. State, 776 So. 2d 160, 175 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) ("When a
purported invocation of a Fifth Amendment privilege is ambiguous, the police may
question the accused for the narrow purpose of clarifying the unequivocal request."),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 966 (2000).
Alaska-has not yet decided whether invocation need be unambiguous. Munson v.
State, 123 P.3d 1042, 1047 (Alaska 2005).
Arizona-uses clarification approach; says will follow that approach until the Supreme
Court of the state tells the lower courts to follow Davis for purposes of determining
whether the suspect invoked the right to remain silent. State v. Strayhand, 911 P.2d
577, 592 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
Arkansas-adopts Davis for right to remain silent. Bowen v. State, 911 S.W.2d 555,
565 (Ark. 1995) ("We see no distinction between the right to counsel and the right to
remain silent with respect to the manner in which it must be effected."), cert. denied,
517 U.S. 1226 (1996); Standridge v. State, 951 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Ark. 1997).
California-appears to have adopted Davis for right to remain silent. People v.
Stitely, 108 P.3d 182, 196 (Cal. 2005) ("In order to invoke the Fifth Amendment
privilege .... the suspect 'must unambiguously' assert his right to silence or counsel."
(citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994))), cert. denied, 546 U.S.
865 (2005); People v. Furness, No. B 183779, 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS 6249, at *8 (Cal.
Ct. App. July 19, 2006). But see In Re John W., No. G031077, 2005 Cal. App.
LEXIS 7782 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2005) (holding that the police must ask
clarifying questions if ambiguous); People v. Bates, No. D045113, 2005 Cal. App.
LEXIS 11604 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2005) (same).
Colorado-adopts Davis for right to remain silent. People v. Arroyo, 988 P.2d 1124,
1131 (Colo. 1999) (following majority of other states and federal jurisdictions in
applying Davis).
Connecticut-no case.
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Delaware-uses clarification rule under state constitution. Garvey v. State, 873
A.2d 291,296 (Del. 2005) (noting that under the Delaware Constitution, if a suspect
attempts to invoke his rights equivocally, the police must clarify).
Florida-adopts Davis for right to remain silent. Owen v. State, 862 So. 2d 687, 698
(Fla. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 986 (2006).
Georgia-has not decided, but has suggested that the clarification approach may be
appropriate. Green v. State, 570 S.E.2d 207, 209-10 (Ga. 2002) ("This Court pre-
viously expressed its approval of a requirement that interrogators strictly limit their
questioning to [whether a suspect wants to invoke their rights] once that person has
made an ambiguous or equivocal statement implicating that right. However, this
Court has not yet addressed whether such clarification is a requirement in Georgia
or is simply the better practice. We need not address that question now, however,
because we find that Green's assertion of his right to silence was unambiguous.").
Hawaii-no case (but does not use Davis even for the right to counsel). See State v.
Hoey, 881 P.2d 504, 523 (Haw. 1994).
Idaho-adopts Davis for right to remain silent. State v. Law, 39 P.3d 661, 664-65
(Idaho Ct. App. 2002) (adopting Davis); State v. Whipple, 5 P.3d 478,482-84 (Idaho
Ct. App. 2000) (implicitly adopting Davis).
Illinois-no case.
Indiana-no case.
Iowa-no case.
Kansas-requires that invocation of right to remain silent be unambiguous without
citing Davis. State v. Holmes, 102 P.3d 406,419 (Kan. 2004); State v. Bieker, 132
P.3d 478, 481 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).
Kentucky-requires that invocation of right to remain silent be unambiguous without
citing Davis. Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 847 (Ky. 2004), cert. denied,
544 U.S. 931 (2005).
Louisiana-adopts Davis for right to remain silent. State v. Robertson, 712 So. 2d 8,
29 (La. 1998) (holding that the state can continue questioning if the right to remain
silent or the right to counsel is not specifically invoked), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 882
(1998); State v. Gaspard, 709 So. 2d 213,220 (La. Ct. App. 1998) ("If the invocation
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of the right to counsel must be unambiguous, then certainly the invocation of the right
to remain silent must also be unambiguous.").
Maine-requires that invocation of right to remain silent be unambiguous without
citing Davis. State v. Grant, No. CR-04-731, 2006 Me. Super. LEXIS 15 (Me.
Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 2006), aff'd, 939 A.2d 93 (Me. 2008). But state court of last resort
has held Davis does not apply pre-waiver. State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223,228 (Me.
2000) (declining to extend Davis to ambiguous invocation of right to remain silent
in the absence of a prior waiver).
Maryland-appears to apply Davis post-waiver but rejects application pre-waiver.
Freeman v. State, 857 A.2d 557, 570 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) ("While there may
well be sound reason to apply the logic of Davis to the matter of an ambiguous invo-
cation of the right to silence that follows a valid waiver of Miranda rights, that logic
does not extend to an ambiguous invocation that occurs prior to the initial waiver
of rights.").
Massachusetts-has not decided. Commonwealth v. Sicari, 752 N.E.2d 684,696 n. 13
(Mass. 2001) ("[W]e need not decide whether to adopt the 'clear articulation rule."').
Michigan-adopts Davis for right to remain silent. People v. Harris, No. 220547, 2001
WL 668957, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. May 11, 2001); People v. Granderson, 538
N.W.2d 471, 474 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). But see People v. Draper, No. 188113,
1997 Mich. App. LEXIS 560, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 1997) (holding that if
there is an equivocal invocation of right to remain silent, the police can continue
questioning to seek clarification).
Minnesota-no case.
Mississippi-adopts the clarification approach but did not discuss Davis. Holland
v. State, 587 So. 2d 848, 856 (Miss. 1991).
Missouri-no case.
Montana-no case.
Nebraska-adopts Davis for right to remain silent. State v. Moss, No. A-05-1132,
2007 Neb. App. LEXIS 5, at * 14 (Neb. Ct. App. Jan. 16,2007) ("This court recognized
[the Davis] holding in [a prior case], and following the majority of jurisdictions,
which had considered the issue, we held that the Davis 'clear articulation rule' was
applicable to invocations of the Miranda right to remain silent.").
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New Hampshire-no case.
New Jersey-no post-Davis case; pre-Davis supported clarification approach. State
v. Bey, 548 A.2d 887, 931 (N.J. 1988) (holding that where suspect ambiguously
asserts Miranda rights, police should stop and clarify).
New Mexico--no case.
New York-holds that the right must be unambiguously asserted to cut off questions
without citing Davis. People v. Brandon, 770 N.Y.S.2d 825, 831 (Crim. Ct. 2003).
Nevada-no case.
North Carolina-adopts Davis for the right to remain silent (although calling it a Sixth
Amendment right). State v. Golphin, 533 S.E.2d 168,225 (N.C. 2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 931 (2001).
North Dakota-adopts Davis for right to remain silent. State v. Greybull, 579 N.W.2d
161, 163 (N.D. 1998).
Ohio-adopts Davis for the right to remain silent. State v. Murphy, 747 N.E.2d 765,
779 (Ohio 2001) ("Although Davis dealt with invocations of the right to counsel, we
think it also applies to the right to remain silent."), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1116 (2002).
Oklahoma-no case.
Oregon-no case.
Pennsylvania-no clear decision. The closest was a confusing opinion that said that
Davis related to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and therefore was not applicable
to Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, No. 83-CR-748,
2003 WL 25287128 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Aug. 20, 2003), affd, 889 A.2d 501 (Pa. 2005),
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 848 (2006).
Rhode Island-no case.
South Carolina-adopts Davis for the right to remain silent. State v. Reed, 503 S.E.2d
747, 750 (S.C. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1150 (1999).
South Dakota-no case.
Tennessee-adopts Davis for the right to remain silent. State v. Mason, No. 02C-01-
9310-CC-00233, 1996 WL 111200, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 1996).
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Texas-adopts Davis for the right to remain silent. Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d
244, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Utah-somewhat unclear. Generally adopts Davis, but says if invocation is some-
thing like "I don't want to talk about it," that is ambiguous with regard to scope and
otherwise unambiguous, and that kind of statement requires clarification. State v.
Tiedemann, 162 P.3d 1106, 1111 (Utah 2007) (emphasis added).
Vermont-adopts Davis for right to remain silent. State v. Bacon, 658 A.2d 54,65
(Vt. 1995) ("Without doubt, [Davis] applies equally to situations in which a defendant
who has waived his Miranda rights ambiguously invokes the right to remain silent
during the subsequent interrogation."), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 837 (1995).
Virginia-adopts the notion that the suspect must clearly invoke his rights without
mentioning Davis. Midkiff v. Commonwealth, 462 S.E.2d 112, 115 (Va. 1995).
Washington-adopts Davis for the right to remain silent. State v. Fitzgerald, No.
56952-0-1, 2007 WL 1241518, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2007) (holding that a
suspect must unequivocally assert right to remain silent); State v. Hill, No. 55071-3-1,
2006 WL 3056408, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2006) (holding that Davis only
applies post-waiver).
West Virginia-adopts Davis as "an analytical starting point," but suggested that it
was not "adopting Davis as part of West Virginia's jurisprudence." State v. Farley,
452 S.E.2d 50,59 n.12 (W. Va. 1994); State v. Bradshaw, 457 S.E.2d 456,470 (W.
Va. 1995) (holding that a suspect must clearly and unambiguously indicate he wants
to cease all questions and not simply refuse to answer certain questions before police
must stop), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 872 (1995).
Wisconsin-adopts Davis for right to remain silent. State v. Markwardt, 742 N.W.2d
546, 554 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007).
Wyoming-expressly did not decide if Davis applies to right to remain silent. Pefia
v. State, 98 P.3d 857, 868 (Wyo. 2004) (positing reasons why Davis might not apply
to right to remain silent, but saying the court did not need to decide because police
officers here clarified an ambiguous request).
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